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THE GAP-FILLING ROLE OF PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
Michael P. Vandenbergh, - Jim Rossi, -' and Ian Faucher-'Private environmental governance provides new tools that can fill gaps
in government regulatory regimes. The Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) is a valuable case study for testing the efficacy of private
environmental governance because it is one of the largest utility carbon
emitters and is largely insulated from near-term federal and state
government pressure to reduce emissions. TVA is not on a trajectory to
achieve the decarbonization targets necessary to meet the goals of the
Paris Agreement, but private governance initiatives can motivate TVA to
accelerate its decarbonization process. TVA's securities filings
acknowledge that it faces material threats on the energy supply side from
distributed generation and customer preferences for renewable energy,
and on the energy demand side from efficiency and conservation. Private
governance initiatives could address the supply side by inducing large
corporate and institutional customers, bondholders, and households to
press for decarbonization of TVA's generation assets. On the demand
side, private initiatives could motivate action by offering TVA
accelerated electrification of motor vehicle fleets and buildings in return
for accelerated decarbonization of TVA's generation assets. The Article
concludes that these private governance options are not a panacea, but
they have the potential to fill an important gap in public climate
governance and pose little risk of displacing more effective government
action. The TVA example also demonstrates the wide range of private
governance options that are available to motivate emissions reductions
by other difficult-to-regulate emissions sources.
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INTRODUCTION

A central challenge for climate mitigation is the gap between the
actions needed to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change and the
likelihood of an adequate government response. Prompt, major emissions
reductions are necessary, yet federal legislation, whether in the form of a
Green New Deal or a carbon tax, may require not only a change of control
of the White House, but also sixty votes in the Senate.' National polls that
signal majority support for climate-friendly politicians and policies can
1 See, e.g., Nives Dolsak, Aseem Prakash & Sarah Tucker, Labor Unions and the Green New
Deal:
Love,
Hate,
or
Indifference?,
FORBES
(July
6,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/07/06/labor-unions-and-the-green-new-deallove-hate-or-indifference/#1a736d5926b8 (discussing the challenges to adopting the Green New
Deal from unions).
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be misleading given the deep polarization of the United States ("U.S.")
electorate, the effects of the Electoral College and Citizens United on
presidential elections, and the fact that states with less than 20% of the
U.S. population control a majority of votes in the Senate.2
Existing approaches to public governance of the energy sector exhibit
substantial gaps, fragmented regulatory authority, unclear regulatory
goals, and federal-state jurisdictional overlaps. For example, U.S. law
articulates no clear national greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions
reduction target, and states-not the federal government-set their own
targets for the electric power generation mix. Yet even when faced with
a material risk and short time fuse, academic and policy debates proceed
as if the feasibility of adopting government laws, policies and programs
does not matter.
Private environmental governance provides a valuable response by
identifying viable new tools' that can fill gaps in federal and state
regulatory regimes.' Private environmental governance occurs when
private actors perform the traditionally governmental functions of
reducing negative externalities, managing common pool resources, and
distributing environmental amenities. 6 In the last decade, private
environmental governance initiatives have focused on many of the same

2 See Eric W. Orts, Senate Democracy: Resolving Our Lockean Paradox, 68 AM. UL. REV.
1981, 1985-86 (citing FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE
UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 10-11 (1999)).
3 See Jonathan M. Gilligan & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accountingfor Political Opportunity
Costs in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014); Lawrence H. Goulder, Timing
Is Everything: How Economists Can Better Address the Urgency of Stronger Climate Policy, 14
REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 143 (2020).

4 MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GLLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE

GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M.
Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 2, 217 (2015).
5 These gaps arise because sectors that contribute major emissions have sufficient political
lobbying power or public appeal to resist government regulation (e.g., the coal, petroleum,
agriculture and household sectors) and because jurisdictions that oppose climate mitigation hinder
cooperation across national and state boundaries. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and
Climate Change: Restrainingthe Presentto Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009);
VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
6 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129
(2013); SarahE. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallelsin Public andPrivateEnvironmentalGovernance,
5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2015); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as
EnvironmentalLaw, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019).
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subjects and used many of the same instruments as public governance,
and they are particularly important for addressing climate change.'
A common concern about private initiatives is that they could lead to
negative policy spillovers.9 For instance, they could reduce demand for
government action if they induce the public to believe that private
initiatives have solved the problem. Negative spillovers also could occur
if directing resources toward promoting private initiatives reduces the
resources available for promoting government initiatives."o Of course,
private initiatives also could accelerate the adoption of government
measures. They could build constituencies that support emissions
reductions or circumvent worldview-based political gridlock by offering
options that are more attractive to moderates and conservatives." They
also could serve a proof-of-concept function, reduce the cost of
coordination among private actors, or reduce the cost of government
measures after the measures are adopted.12
This Article uses the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") as a case
study to explore the role of private environmental governance when the
risks of displacing public governance are low. TVA is a large source of
GHG emissions, and it is unlikely to be subject to near-term federal or
state GHG regulation. Congress created TVA in 1933 as a public
corporation, gave it the exclusive right to sell electricity in a large service
area that spans portions of seven states in the Southeast, and limited state
regulatory oversight of its electricity operations. TVA accounts for
approximately one percent of all U.S. GHG emissions, an amount
roughly equal to all the emissions from the iron and steel sector or cement

7 See Light & Orts, supra note 6; Sarah E. Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, in ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 253-67 (Robert Glicksman & LeRoy Paddock eds., 2016).

OF

8 David G. Victor, Faced with Government Inaction, PrivateFirms Emerge as Major Players
in
Climate
Change
Mitigation,
SCIENCE,
Dec.
18,
2017,
https://blogs.sciencemag.org/books/2017/12/18/beyond-politics/ (book review).
9 See Heather Barnes Truelove et al., Positive and Negative Spillover of Pro-Environmental
Behavior: An Integrative Review and TheoreticalFramework, 29 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 127

(2014) (distinguishing behavioral spillover effects from policy spillover effects); Thomas P. Lyon
& John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: CorporateEnvironmentalDisclosure Under Threat ofAudit, 20
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 3 (2006).
10 See Josh Galperin, Trust Me, I'm a Pragmatist:A PartiallyPragmaticCritique ofPragmatic
Activism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425, 494 (2017) (arguing that in some situations private
governance initiatives "can weaken the entire endeavor"); Josh Galperin, BoardRooms and Jail
Cells: Assessing NGO Approaches to Private Environmental Governance, 71 ARK. L. REV. 403
(2018) (discussing risks of private climate governance).
11 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
12 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Keynote: Motivating Private Climate Governance: The Role of
the Efficiency Gap, 71 ARK. L. REV. 349 (2018) (responding to Galperin).
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sector in the U.S. 13 Lower natural gas prices, litigation, and other factors
induced TVA to reduce its emissions by 51% between 2012 and 2018,14
allowing TVA to produce electricity with a carbon intensity below the
national average in 2018. New federal GHG regulations are unlikely to
create pressure for additional near-term reductions, though, and most
states in the TVA service area have resisted pressure to regulate GHG
emissions.1

In addition, TVA's long-term emissions trajectory creates two
problems. First, based on its most recent integrated resource planning
("IRP") document, TVA is not on a pathway to achieve widely-adopted
decarbonization targets. Multiple studies suggest that deep
decarbonization is necessary to achieve the 2oC goal adopted in the Paris
Agreement, which for the U.S. electric utility sector means emissions
reductions of roughly 80-100% by 2050.16 Based on its most recent IRP
base case, by 2030 TVA's emissions will be higher than this "80 by 50"
pathway, and the gap will grow over time, exceeding the pathway by 75%
by 2038.17 Second, TVA faces an increasing mismatch between its
renewable power generation and the renewables commitments of many
of its customers. TVA's low-carbon electricity generation arises in large

13 See

U.S.

EMISSIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
AND
SINKS:
1990-2017
ES-6
tbl.ES-2
(2019),

https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-maintext.pdf. The Tennessee Valley Authority is one of many federal entities at the public-private
boundary. For a review, see Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracyat the Boundary, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 841 (2014).
14 For a non-profit group's discussion of TVA's emissions trajectory, see S. ALLIANCE FOR
CLEAN
ENERGY,
TRACKING DECARBONIZATION
IN
THE SOUTHEAST
22 (2019),
https://cleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/Tracking-Decarbonization-in-the-Southeast-2019.pdf
15 Several have actively sought to block federal or local government efforts to do so. See West
Virginiav. EPA, appealdocketed, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23,2015). State petitioners included
West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and South Carolina.
16 The lower end of this goal is often referred to as the "80 by 50" or "2'C" goal, and for
simplicity in this Article we refer to the pathway necessary to achieve the goal as the "80 by 50" or
"deep decarbonization" pathway. For a discussion of deep decarbonization, see discussion infra
Part II; see also MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOHN C. DERNBACH, LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2019).
17 See infra Part II. See TENN. VALLEY AUTH., 2019 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN
(2019),

https://tva-azr-eastus-cdn-ep-tvawcm-prd.azureedge.net/cdn-tvawcma/docs/defaultsource/default-document-library/site-content/enviromnent/environmental-stewardship/irp/2019documents/tva-201 9-integrated-resource-plan-volume-i-final-resource-plan.pdf [hereinafter TVA
2019 IRP]. TVA is the largest public power utility in the United States. Our analysis is roughly
consistent with the conclusions of a recent report by the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy. See
S. ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 15, at 22 ("[A]ccording to the final IRP, TVA's
likely future resource mix would result in emissions that are only 57%below 2005 levels in 2038.
That means TVA reduced emissions by 51% in 13 years but only plans to get another 6 percentage
points of reductions in the next 20 years.").
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part from nuclear facilities and a shift from coal to natural gas, but many
investors and electric customers are beginning to demand renewable
power, not just low-carbon power.
Although TVA is unlikely to face government pressure, several private
governance tools may motivate TVA to decarbonize more rapidly over
the near-term and the long-term. Like many utilities, TVA's securities
filings acknowledge that it faces material threats on the supply side from
distributed generation and consumer preferences for renewable energy
and on the demand side from efficiency and conservation.19 Private
governance initiatives could target the supply side by increasing pressure
for low-carbon electricity from bondholders, large corporate customers,
large institutional customers, and households. 20 For instance, a substantial
number of TVA's large industrial, retail, and institutional electricity
customers have made renewables or climate commitments that will be
difficult to satisfy unless they induce TVA to decarbonize more rapidly
or they defect from the TVA grid.21 Cities in the region are also beginning
to make decarbonization commitments.22 A private governance initiative
that mobilizes these private and public TVA customers and directs their
attention to the mismatch between their commitments and TVA's
emissions pathway could accelerate the decarbonization of the TVA grid.
On the demand side, private initiatives could motivate TVA to reduce
GHG emissions by linking decarbonization to transportation and building
electrification. In this Article, we focus primarily on motor vehicles, but
electrification of buildings-including water heaters and other
appliances, heating and cooling systems, and other aspects of the built
environment-provides many similar opportunities. Commitments for
accelerated electrification of vehicle fleets can be made contingent on
accelerated decarbonization of TVA's generation assets. Because
18 See discussioninfra Part III.
19 See discussioninfra Part II.
20 See discussioninfra Part III.
21 For instance, the largest solar installations in the TVA service area have been made in
response to demands by Facebook and Google, which insisted on renewable power from within the
service area before they would locate major new facilities in the area. Heather Clancy, Facebook
Gets Specific About Its 100

Percent Renewables Target, GREENBIZ,

Aug.

30,

2018,

https://www.greenbiz.com/article/facebook-gets-specific-about-its-100-percent-renewablestarget-0; Dave Flessner, Planningfor the Future: TVA Seeks More Forms ofRenewable Energy as
Google, Facebook Buy 675 Megawatts ofSolar Power, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Apr.

2, 2019, https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2019/apr/02/tvseeksmore-renewable-power/491816/.
22 Many cities in the TVA service area are "blue dots in a red sea"-they reflect public support
for climate mitigation and renewables that is not reflected in the actions of state governments in the
region. See 2016 District-by-DistrictState Legislative Control, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE

LEGISLATURES (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/district-bydistrict-state-legislative-control.aspx.
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reduced demand is a substantial concern for TVA, it may be motivated
by the potential for increased demand from electric vehicles. Although
electricity use increased across the U.S. and the TVA service area for
decades following World War II, in the last decade per capita household
electricity use has leveled off and has begun to decline.2 3 Much of this
reduction has been attributed to the uptake of light-emitting diode
("LED") lightbulbs by households, but the TVA service area lags behind
much of the nation in energy efficiency, and many additional steps are
available to increase household, commercial, industrial, and other energy
efficiency and conservation, further reducing TVA's demand.24 In
addition, the growth of battery and other storage technologies may make
customer defection from the grid an increasing threat to TVA and other
utilities.
The combination of decarbonization of the electric grid and
electrification of vehicles and buildings can yield 60% or greater
reductions in area carbon emissions. This combination is thus is an
essential feature if the goal is to achieve the 80 by 50 pathway in the TVA
service area. Electrification of the motor vehicle fleet will reduce carbon
emissions, but the emissions reductions will be far greater if the grid is
also decarbonized.2 5 TVA has identified electrification of the motor
vehicle fleet as its most important demand growth opportunity.2 6 As a
result of both TVA's interest in increasing demand via electrification of
transportation and buildings and TVA's customers' interest in grid
decarbonization, an opportunity exists for an agreement among TVA and
its customers. In return for TVA's commitment to decarbonize electricity
generation along an 80 by 50 pathway, TVA's major customers could
commit to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles via fleet purchases
and other steps.
The TVA example highlights the importance of private governance
options for other difficult-to-regulate organizations. For instance, many
other major GHG sources in the U.S. Southeast are not subject to state
23 For a discussion of electricity demand, see Lucas W. Davis, Evidence of a Decline in
Electricity Use by U.S. Households, 37 ECON. BULL. 1098, Part IV (2017).
24 See Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gardner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stem & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce U.S.
Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 18452 (2009).
25 Joshua S. Graff Zivin, Matthew Kotchen & Erin T. Mansur, Spatial and Temporal
Heterogeneity ofMarginalEmissions:Implicationsfor Electric Carsand Other Electricity-Shifting
Policies, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 248 (2014) (stating that in the average electric grid, an
electric vehicle generates fewer carbon emissions than a fossil fuel vehicle). For a discussion of the
importance of combining decarbonization of the electric grid with electrification of the
transportation and building sectors, see Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Forks in
the Road, 31 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. (forthcoming 2020).
26 See TVA 2019 IRP, supra note 17.
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government pressure, and the region would be the world's sixth largest
emitter of CO 2 if it were a country. 27 Similarly, many utilities in the
Midwest and Mountain West also face limited government pressure to
decarbonize. Sources located in countries that are not pursuing climate
mitigation are also promising targets for private governance initiatives,
as are global shipping and aviation.28
The Article begins in Part I by exploring the basis for concluding that
the 80 by 50 goal is necessary for reducing the risk of catastrophic climate
change. Part II then explores why governments are unlikely to require
TVA to accelerate its decarbonization in the near term. The Article turns
in Part III to private governance initiatives. It begins with an analysis of
the private sector pressure on TVA to supply low-carbon power,
including commitments that signal an interest in decarbonization by
bondholders, current and new corporate customers, large institutional
customers, and households. It then examines pressure for decarbonization
arising from demand-related issues and explores the possibility of
connecting TVA's interest in increasing demand with its customers'
interest in decarbonization. The Article concludes by suggesting that
private governance initiatives also may be valuable for other difficult-toregulate organizations.
I.

WHY DEEP DECARBONIZATION?

Putting aside responsibility for past emissions, TVA's regulatory
status raises climate mitigation concerns if its emissions pathway exceeds
its fair share of the reductions necessary to achieve the widely accepted
climate 2oC goal adopted in the Paris Agreement. This Part explores the
basis for the widespread adoption of this deep decarbonization goal,
identifies the emissions pathway necessary to achieve it, and
demonstrates that the likely emissions pathway for TVA substantially
exceeds the 80 by 50 pathway after 2030.
A.

The Deep DecarbonizationGoal and EmissionsPathways

The Paris Agreement included a target of limiting the increase in
global average temperature to no more than 2oC over preindustrial levels,
and this target has been widely adopted by national and subnational

27 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY-RELATED CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS BY STATE,

2005-2016
(2019),
https://www.eia.gov/enviromnent/emissions/state/analysis/pdf/stateanalysis.pdf.
28 See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Daniel J. Metzger, Private EnvironmentalGovernance: The
Case ofAviation, 30 FORDHAMENVTL. L. REv 62 (2018).
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governments, corporations, and other organizations.29 No one target has
been identified as a safe level of temperature increase, but climate
scientists have indicated that as temperatures increase above 1.5 to 2oC,
steep increases occur in the risk of feedback effects: adverse weather
events, sea level rise, species loss, and threats to human health, security,
food systems, water supply, and economic growth.30 In other work, one
of us has analogized exceeding the 2oC goal to driving a car in the red
zone on a tachometer; doing so does not guarantee engine failure, but the
chance that it will occur increases sharply.31
Many different emissions reduction pathways could reduce the risk of
exceeding the 2oC target,32 but economy-wide emissions pathways
consistent with averting the 2oC level of warming require net-zero global
emissions by at least the year 2070.33 In addition, these pathways require
the U.S. and other developed countries to reduce overall GHG emissions
by at least 80% from 1990 levels by 2050.34 These reductions will require
systemic changes to the American energy economy, collectively termed
"deep decarbonization": highly efficient use of energy across economic
sectors, almost complete decarbonization of the electricity grid,
significant decarbonization of other energy sources, and fuel switching to
electricity and other low-carbon energy supplies for vehicles and
buildings.35
To reach the 80% economy-wide emissions reduction goal by 2050,
the American energy system will require continuous transformation over

29 For an overview, see GERRARD & DERNBACH, supra note 16. See also What is a science-

based target?, SCIENCE BASED TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/what-is-a-science-basedtarget/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2019); "We Are Still In" Declaration, WE ARE STIL IN,
https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-declaration (last visited Oct. 13, 2019); States Unitedfor
Climate Action, U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2019); The ParisAgreement,UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement
(last visited
April 20, 2020, 11:20 AM). Roughly 180 countries have adopted the goal of keeping global
warming "well below" a 2'C increase over pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the
increase to 1.5'C.
30 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 0 C (Valerie

Masson-Delmotte
et
al.
eds.,
2019),
at
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full
[hereinafter GLOBAL WARMING OF 1 .5 0 C].

Technical
Summary,
Report High Res.pdf

31 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
32 JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED

STATES U.S. 2050 VOL. 1 TECHNICAL REPORT (rev. with technical supplement 2015),
http://deepdecarbonization.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/1 1/USDeepDecarbonizationTechnicalReport.pdf
[hereinafter
PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION].
33 GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C, supra note 30, at ch. 2.
34 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supranote 32.
35

Id.
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the next three decades. According to the U.S. Deep Decarbonization
Pathways Project ("DDPP"), a leading framework for evaluating
decarbonization options, the baseline ("mixed case") traj ectory consistent
with this goal requires economy-wide U.S. emissions reductions of at
least 80% by 2050 (from 2005 levels). 36 This trajectory also requires
fossil fuel-based electricity generation to gradually decline through 2050
and remaining coal plants to be retired by the late 2030s. This pathway is
consistent with the Obama Administration's since-revoked commitment
to reduce total U.S. GHG emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by
2025.37 Although the Trump Administration has withdrawn from the Paris
Agreement and has backtracked on the regulatory measures designed to
achieve interim U.S. emissions reduction targets, many other
governments and private organizations have adopted the 2oC goal or
emissions reduction targets consistent with the goal. Examples include
major national governments around the world and many U.S. states and
cities, as well as hundreds of global corporations.38 Many of these
commitments have been made through the Science-Based Targets
Initiative, which supports efforts by corporations and other organizations
to adopt targets consistent with limiting global warming to 1. 5oC or 2oC. 39
Although policy debates often focus on the reductions necessary by
2050, actions before 2050 are important. Maintaining high emissions
levels over the next several decades with a steep reduction immediately
before 2050 will not achieve the 2oC goal. In addition to the 80%
reductions required by 2050, the DDPP deep decarbonization trajectory
requires U.S. emissions reductions from 2005 levels of at least 3 5 % by
2030, 45% by 2035, and 65% by 2040." Achieving the 2050 goal will
require major transformation of infrastructure, land use, industrial
systems, and energy systems, which will become more difficult and
costly if intermediate targets are not achieved. Global decarbonization
pathways require near-term changes to avoid cost escalation, stranded
assets, and reduced response flexibility in the long term. In addition,
because carbon dioxide has long residence times in the atmosphere, the
level of emissions between now and 2050 will affect global atmospheric
concentrations, temperatures, and the amount of post-2050 emissions
reductions and carbon removal required to meet the 2oC goal. Even with
deep decarbonization efforts between now and 2050, scientists have

36

Id.

37 Id. at 72.
38 See What is a science-basedtarget, supra note 29.
39 Id.; "We Are Still In" Declaration,supra note 29; States Unitedfor Climate Action, supra

note 29.
40 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION,

supranote 32.
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concluded that carbon dioxide removal will be a necessary component of
climate change mitigation due to temperature rises that have already been
locked in due to inaction."
The fact that achieving the 2050 goal will become much more difficult
and costly if intermediate targets are not achieved is particularly
important for the electric utility industry. One essential constraint on
utilities is infrastructure turnover; electric power plants and industrial
boilers, for instance, will likely be replaced only once before 2050.42 If
utilities continue to invest in high-carbon generation capacity, this could
create "infrastructure inertia" that will result in high costs from retrofits
and early retirements that will be required to achieve decarbonization.43
In addition, because limiting climate change requires limiting cumulative
carbon emissions," delaying decarbonization increases the reductions
necessary to achieve equal results. As a result, a comparable
decarbonization effort beginning in 2040 not only would be more costly
than an effort begun in 2020, but also would require reducing emissions
by more than 80% by 2050.
The changes required to achieve deep decarbonization have major
implications for TVA and other electric utilities. As vehicle and building
electrification progresses, electric utilities could see demand
approximately double by 2050, while also being called upon to sharply
reduce the carbon intensity of electricity production. 5 Although
efficiency and conservation measures are predicted to reduce electricity
demand in some cases, demand increases will be driven by uptake of
electric vehicles-expected to account for 9% of global electricity
demand by 205046-and by switching to electricity use in appliances and
other building systems-expected to account for an increased share of
global electricity demand by 2050." In addition, new electricity demand
may arise from increasing fuel production from electricity (e.g., hydrogen
fuel cells)."

41 GLOBAL WARMING OF

1.5'C, supra note 30, at Technical Summary.

42 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION,

supranote 32.
43 See Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering:
Anticipating the Energy TransitionProblem, 102 MINN. L. REv. 1019, 1075-76 (2018).
44 GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5'C, supra note 30, at ch. 2.
45 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supranote 32.
46 BLOOMBERG
NEF,
NEW
ENERGY
OUTLOOK

https://bnef.turtl.co/story/neo2O18.
47 Id.
48 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supranote 32.
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(2018),

Virginia EnvironmentalLaw Journal

12

[Vol. 38: 1

1. Implicationsfor TVA
Drivers of electric utility transformation include not only government
regulation, but also economic and social pressure from customers,
investors, lenders, insurers, employees, non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), and other stakeholders. Prices of photovoltaic modules, wind
turbines, and lithium-ion batteries have fallen in the last decade and are
expected to continue to decline, driving utilities to switch from carbonintensive energy generation to renewables.49 In addition, regulation will
likely play a significant role over the long term, even if near-term
regulatory developments are uncertain. Utility investments account for
decadal time spans, and utilities may assume that U.S. policy makers
ultimately will adopt measures to "ensure that regulatory signals to
network providers [utilities] related to procurement, rate-making, and
cost allocation are consistent with deep decarbonization."'o Utilities thus
may be subject to a combination of long-term regulatory pressure along
with many of the same social and economic pressures that are driving
corporations and other private organizations to decarbonize in the near
term. 5

Despite the lack of near-term pressure from regulators at the federal
level and in many states, a substantial number of utilities have committed
to emissions pathways that meet or exceed the 80 by 50 pathway, as Table
1 shows. 52 In 2018, Minnesota-based Xcel Energy, one of the country's
largest electric utilities, became the first to commit to carbon neutrality,
and others 53 have since followed suit. ' In 2018, coal-heavy Consumers
49 BLOOMBERGNEF, supra note 46.
50 JAMES H. WLLIAMS ET AL., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE

UNITED STATES US 2050 VOL. 2 POLICY REPORT 11 (2015), http://usddpp.org/dowloads/2015report-on-policy-implications.pdf.
51 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 4, at ch. 4.

52 Sophia Ptacek & Sheryl Carter, More Utilities Make Big Commitments to Climate Action,
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/sophia-

ptacek/more-utilities-make-big-commitments-climate-action.
53 These include Austin Energy, Avista, Green Mountain Power, Hawaiian Electric, Idaho
Power Public Service Enterprise Group, New York Power Authority, Platte River Power Authority,
see infra notes 54 & 57.
54 See

XCEL

ENERGY,

DESTINATION

2050

BUILDING

THE

FUTURE

(2018),

https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xeresponsive/Company/Corporate%/20Responsibility%/`2oReport/CRR-carbon-free-future.pdf
(noting that Xcel had committed to "provide customers with 100% carbon-free electricity by 2050
and to reduce carbon emissions by 80% by 2030 from the electricity that serves our customers");
Emily Kaldjian & Priya Barua, The US Underwent a Quiet Clean Energy Revolution Last Year,
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/01/us-underwentquiet-clean-energy-revolution-last-year; Dave Kovaleski, PSEG launchesplan to achieve net-zero
carbon

emissions

by

2050,

DAILY

ENERGY

INSIDER

(July

26,

https://dailyenergyinsider.com/news/20760-pseg-launches-plan-to-achieve-net-zero-carbonemissions-by-2050/.

2019),
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Energy in Michigan announced its intent to phase out its use of coal and
cut emissions by 80% by 2040. A review of investor-owned Midwest
utilities found that more than 75% have set renewables or emissions goals
beyond their statutory obligations.5 5 Not all utilities are on this track, but
as of mid-2019, at least nine of the twenty largest publicly traded U.S.
power producers have made long-term decarbonization commitments.5 6

Table 1: Utility Decarbonization Commitments 57
Uitility

Goal

AEP Ohio
Armeren
Austin
Energy
Avangrid
Avista

Consumers

r
on
Energy
CMS Energy
Corporation
CPS Energy
DTE Energy

Date

80% emissions reduction from 2000
levels
80% emissions reduction from 2005
levels

2050
2050

Zero carbon energy

2050

Carbon neutral
100% carbon free

2035
2045

2040

0

2040

80% emissions reduction
80% emissions reduction and coalfree
80% non-emitting energy sources
80% emissions reduction

2040

First Energy

90% emissions reduction from 2005
levels

2045

Green

100% carbon free (2025) and 100%
renewable energy

Mountain
Power

2040
2040

55 CLIMATE
MAJORITY
PROJECT,
NET-ZERO
BY
2050
(2019),
https://static 1.squarespace.com/static/5c3 31 55fec4eb7e2b8479aeb/t/5c77b5bbe4966bf9556f1554/
155 1349208857/net-zero-report.pdf.
56 Utility

Carbon

Reduction

Tracker,

SMART

ELECTRIC

POWER

ALLIANCE,

https://sepapower.org/decarbonization-tracker/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
57 See Kaldjian & Barua, supra note 54; Sven Berg, Idaho Power sets goal for 100-percent
clean energy by 2045, IDAHO POWER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.idahopower.com/news/idahopower-sets-goal-for-100-percent-clean-energy-by-2045/; CLIMATE MAJORITY PROJECT, supra
note 55; Kovaleski, supra note 54.
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Hawaiian

100% carbon neutral

Electric
Idaho Power
LADWP
Madison Gas
and Electric
National
Grid
NYPA

renewable energy
100% clean energy
100% coal free
Net zero carbon electricity

NiSource Inc
Platte River
Power
Authority
PNM

Portland
General Electric
Poudre
Valle E80%
Valley REA
PSEG
WEC Energy
Xcel Energy

and 100%

80% emissions reduction from 1990
levels
100% carbon free electricity
92% emissions reduction from 2005
levels
100% coal free

[Vol. 38: 1
2045
2045
2025
2050
2050
2040
2028
2018

100% carbon free energy

2030

100% emissions free energy

2040

80% reduction of GHG emissions

2050

carbon free energy
Net zero carbon emissions
80% emissions reductions from
2005 levels
Zero carbon energy

2030
2050
2050
2050

In contrast, although TVA has reduced its carbon intensity by over
50% since 2005, it has not committed to achieve an emissions pathway
consistent with the 2oC goal, and it plans little change in its mix of coal,
natural gas, and renewable power over the next twenty years. In 2019,
TVA finalized an IRP through 2038.5' Although TVA has left the door
open for incremental decarbonization by declining to identify a particular
resource strategy, its business-as-usual strategy-which "reflect(s)
decisions made to date by the TVA Board of Directors" and "is the most
economic and has the lowest average cost and risk exposure"-would
increase TVA's share of carbon-free energy (nuclear, hydroelectric, and
renewables) from 53% in 2018 to just 58% in 2038, based on its current
economic and technological outlook. 59 In the 2019 IRP, TVA notes that
its share of carbon-free energy could climb to 75% in 2038 if technology
58

TVA 2019 IRP, supra note 17.

59 Id.
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advances quickly and consumer preferences shift, but it also indicates that
its share could fall as low as 45% if the Tennessee Valley experiences
strong migration and economic growth. Under this base strategy and
TVA's current economic and technical outlook, TVA expects coal to
provide 16% and natural gas to contribute a further 24% of its energy in
2038.60

TVA's IRP does not compare its projected GHG emissions to any
target, but it is possible to construct a TVA pathway from its base case
and to compare that pathway to the target pathway charted for U.S.
utilities by the DDPP. As Figure 1 suggests, by 2030 TVA's trajectory
would place it far away from the generation mix necessary for the deep
decarbonization pathway, which requires U.S. utilities to entirely
eliminate coal in the 2030s and to limit natural gas and other fossil fuels
to less than 13% of total electric generation by 2050.61

60

Id.

61 PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION, supranote 32.
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Figure 1: GHG Emissions Intensity of TVA Electricity 62
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62 The U.S. Electric Utilities pathway reflects the Mixed Case scenario provided in the Pathways
to Deep Decarbonizationin the UnitedStates US 2050 Vol. 1 Technical Report, assembled by the
DDPP. The TVA pathway reflects the linear pathway between its 2018 generation portfolio (as
provided online at "TVA: Our Power System") and the generation portfolio that would result from
the Base Case strategy and Current Outlook scenario provided in the 2019 Integrated Resource
Plan. Though TVA did not explicitly select the Base Case strategy for its generation future, it has
indicated that this strategy "reflect(s) decisions made to date by the TVA Board of Directors" and
"is the most economic and has the lowest average cost and risk exposure" among its strategies. Id.
at 9-4. By declining to choose a particular strategy, TVA can publicly hold out the option of
significant decarbonization, even if it does not pursue it. The principal regional news article on the
IRP leads by touting the possibility that TVA will add "up to 14 GW of solar generation by 2038."
Id. Although this possibility falls within TVA's sensitivities, it is not representative of any of the
30 outcomes TVA analyzes in the IRP, the most ambitious of which would increase the system's
renewable capacity (solar and wind) by 6.2 GW. Id. at G-1 1. Part of this discrepancy is attributable
to confusing terminology while TVA's IRP generally refers to capacity additions in terms of
Summer Net Dependable (SND) capacity, it presents wind and solar capacity additions in terms of
nameplate capacity, which dwarf the SND capacity of these resources by as much as 300-400%.
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Compared to the DDPP's utility trajectory, which is consistent with
limiting global warming to 2 0 C, TVA's GHG emissions intensity will fall
behind targeted levels before 2030, and by 2038 will be 74% higher than
the utility target. Similarly, although TVA currently provides more than
the targeted share of its electricity from carbon-free sources (largely due
to its significant nuclear and hydroelectric resources), it will fall
significantly behind before 2038 if it follows the base case trajectory
suggested in its IRP. Even under the most ambitious strategy addressed
in the IRP, TVA's emissions intensity would be 13% above the target in
2038. We discuss the implications of this carbon intensity deficit-the
gap between TVA's emissions pathway and the pathway necessary for
deep decarbonization-in Parts II and III below.
TVA also faces two other potential shortfalls: a gap between its
emissions and the emissions of many competing utilities and a gap
between its renewable power generation and the commitments of many
of its major customers. As discussed above, almost half of the major
utilities have committed to decarbonization pathways, and recent trends
have been toward additional commitments even as the federal
government has backed off of GHG emissions requirements. If the
utilities meet their commitments, the result will be that TVA's electric
grid will have a higher carbon intensity by 2030 than the grids of many
other regions that compete for economic activity. As to renewables, many
states, cities, and major utility customers are insisting not just on clean or
low-carbon power, which in some cases can include nuclear and large
hydropower projects, but also renewable power from sources such as
wind and solar. TVA reports that its current power generation includes
only 3% renewable power (other than hydroelectric), which is
substantially below the average6 3-much less the top third-of utilities,
and future projections are even more problematic given the widespread
commitments of other utilities.6 4 According to TVA's 2019 IRP, TVA
may increase renewable power "up to 14,000 megawatts," but it has not
announced a plan to do so.65 In fact, TVA has made no public
commitment to increase its overall use of renewable power, although as
discussed in Part III it has taken some promising steps in the last year.
TVA thus faces not only a deficit in the carbon intensity of its grid
compared to the deep decarbonization pathway and the likely pathway of

63 According to EIA, wind, solar, and other non-hydro renewables provided 9% of total utilityscale generation in 2018. See U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, SHORT-TERM
ENERGY OUTLOOK (2020), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/pdf/steo full.pdf.
64 TVA 2019 IRP, supra note 17.
65 Id.
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the utilities in many competing areas, but also a renewable power deficit,
which we also discuss below.
II. PUBLIC

GOVERNANCE OF DIFFICULT-TO-REGULATE ENTITIES: THE

CASE OF TVA

After identifying an environmental problem, the standard public
governance model asks, "What can government do?" 66 Part II explores
the answer to this question and concludes that with the deregulatory
activities underway at the federal level and opposition to climate
mitigation among several of the states in the TVA service area, the answer
is "Not much." 67 This Part reviews the unusual legal and regulatory status
of TVA and why that institutional status, in combination with political
retrenchment at the federal and state levels, has insulated TVA from
many of the pressures that have affected other large sources of GHG
emissions in the U.S. electric power sector. This Part also notes two
potential exceptions to the dim prospects for government action: climate
mitigation actions by states outside the TVA service area and by cities
within the area.
A. What is TVA?
Governance. On May 18, 1933, President Roosevelt signed the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act into law.68 President Roosevelt had
asked Congress to create "a corporation clothed with the power of
government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private
enterprise." 6 9 Congress responded by creating TVA-a "wholly owned
public corporation of the United States"-to promote the Tennessee
Valley's economic development.70 Congress charged TVA with

66 See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND
tendency to ask "What can government do?").

POLITICS, supra

67 See, e.g., ROBERT PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER

H.

note 4, at ch. 3 (discussing the

SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P.

(7th ed. 2013) (addressing
private sector initiatives in the last chapter and expressing skepticism about private governance).
LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY

68 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION (2011). TVA

may be best known to law students as the institution that was at the center of the conflict between
the snail darter and a dam in the leading Endangered Species Act case, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
69 Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress Suggesting the Tennessee Valley
Authority (Apr. 10, 1933) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum)
http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/odtvacon.html. For a review of the functioning and accountability
of TVA, see ERWIN C. HARGROVE, PRISONERS OF MYTH: THE LEADERSHIP OF THE TENNESSEE

VALLEY AUTHORITY, 1933-1990 (1994).
70 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157 (1978).
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improving the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley region through the
integrated management of the region's resources.
At first, TVA focused on reforestation, improving fertilization of
agricultural properties, and building dams,72 but soon after its formation
TVA began constructing new power plants for the region. Over time,
TVA devoted more of its efforts to producing and selling electric power
under the TVA Act's direction "[to] produce, distribute, and sell electric
power"73 in connection with TVA's responsibility to improve navigable
rivers and to provide for the national defense." Congress also provided
TVA with the implied power to dispose of surplus energy."
In many respects, TVA functions much like a typical private electric
utility. The TVA Act provides TVA with the exclusive right to produce
and sell, and an obligation to provide, electricity to customers in its seven
state service region. 6 The TVA Act also provides TVA with a range of
powers typically reserved for the government," such as eminent
domain." TVA acts in some cases as an independent non-governmental
party, exercising the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name.7 9 In
other cases, it functions more like a government agency; until recently
TVA received appropriations from the U.S. Treasury, and it does not have
equity shareholders. As we discuss in more detail below, though, it does
issue publicly-traded debt and files periodic disclosures with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")."o Despite the fact that it
can sue and be sued in its corporate capacity, courts have concluded that
TVA is a governmental agency of the U.S. and is largely free from state
regulation or control, except as Congress may otherwise consent.8
71 TVA STATEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, supra note

68.

Thackerv. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S.Ct. 1435, 1439 (2019).
73 16 U.S.C. § 831d(l) (2019); see also Memphis Power & Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 112
S.W.2d 817, 822 (Tenn. 1937) (stating that "[t]he TVA is a public instrumentality and holds the
electric energy generated at its dams in trust for the people of the whole country"). Because the
United States is a government of enumerated powers, any power mustbe conferred in express terms
orby necessary implication by the Constitution. Ashwanderv. Tenn. Valley Auth., 8 F. Supp. 893,
895 (N.D. Ala. 1934).
74 Ashwander, 8 F. Supp. at 895.
72

75 Id.
76

Thackerv. Tenn. ValleyAuth., 139 S.Ct. 1435 (2019).

77 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 831c-3(a); Mays v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 699 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (2010)
(through amendments to the TVA Act, Congress extended TVA's purposes to "law
enforcement . . in the area of jurisdiction."). Another example of a way that TVA acts like a
government agency is that if the TVA is negligent in a governmental nature, a court may decide
that an implied limitation bars a negligence suit. However, the TVA is not immune from all suits,
if a suit challenges any of its commercial activities.
78 16 U.S.C. §§ 831c(h)-(i); Mays, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
79 Mays, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
80 Posey v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 93 F.2d 726, 727 (5th Cir. 1937).
81 Id.
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Unlike most other utilities, however, TVA faces some federal statutory
constraints on its operations. First, the 1959 amendments to the TVA Act
established what is known as the "TVA fence," which prohibits TVA
from using bond financing to produce electricity to sell outside of its
congressionally mandated territory.82 As a result, although TVA
purchases some of its power from other utilities, 8 3 it is unable to sell its
electricity into the wholesale market, unlike other utilities. Second, the
Energy Policy Act of 1982 created an "anti-cherry picking" requirement
that exempts TVA from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders
requiring utilities to provide transmission access to other companies." As
a result, TVA does not sell power into wholesale power markets, nor do
its wholesale customers (primarily local distribution utilities) typically
have the option to buy power from other suppliers in the interstate market,
as do wholesale customers elsewhere in the U.S.

5

TVA was inspired by the New Deal public power ideal of customer
control, but in practice it is largely insulated from the forms of democratic
control that most energy firms in the U.S. face. Its board is appointed by
the president and confirmed by the Senate, but long, staggered terms for
board members result in limited executive branch control through the
appointments process.86 Originally, TVA had a three-member full-time
board, but the structure changed in 2004 to nine part-time members with
staggered terms." Board members each serve a term of five years." The

16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(a).
During the 2018 fiscal year, TVA's power sales included about 13% of purchased power from
other electric power suppliers, based on kwh. See TENN. VALLEY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM
10-K)
13
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://sec.report/Document/0001376986-18-000046/tve10xk09302018.htm [hereinafter TVA 2018 10-K].
84 16 U.S.C. § 824k(j).
85 As TVA itself reports, "TVA provides electricity in a service area that is largely free of
competition from other electric power providers based on the provisions of the TVA Act." TVA
2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 19.
86 See HARGROVE, supra note 69.
87 As soon as practicable after the enactment of the Appropriations Act of 2005, the President
was to submit to the Senate nominations of six persons to serve as members of the Board of
Directors (the Board) of the TVA in addition to the members serving on the date of enactment of
the act. 108 Pub. L. 447 (2004) ("(A) two members for a term to expire on May 18, 2007; (B) two
members for a term to expire on May 18, 2009; and (C) two members for a term to expire on May
18, 2011.").
88 A member of the Board whose term has expired may continue to serve after the expiration
until a successor takes office, except that the member shall not serve beyond the end of the session
of Congress in which the term of the member expires. A member appointed to fill a vacancy on the
Board occurring before the expiration of the term for which the predecessor the member was
appointed was to be appointed for the remainder of that term. 16 U.S.C. § 831a(a); 16 U.S.C. §
83 1a(d)(1).
82
83
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chief executive has the power of removal, although it is rarely exercised.89
The effect of the staggered board appointments, Senate confirmation, and
executive branch involvement principally through the budget process
leaves TVA only indirectly subject to control by the executive branch,
and much of the potential democratic control is exercised opaquely
through involvement in the board appointments process and other
interventions by members of Congress from the TVA service area.90
Moreover, unlike most utilities, TVA's power resource decisions (such
as its construction of new plants) and its retail transactions, including its
rates, are not controlled by state utility regulators.
Electricity Generation and Distribution. TVA sells power produced
from nuclear power plants, hydroelectric facilities, gas-fired facilities,
and coal-fired units.91 Based on its recent reports of generation capacity,
the relative contributions from these sources are 37% nuclear, 24% coal,
20% natural gas, 9% hydro, and 3% solar and wind. 92 TVA sells power

directly to a small group of large industrial customers, but most of its
power is sold to 154 regional distribution utilities, which purchase power
wholesale from TVA and then sell the power to industrial, commercial,
non-profit, household, and other retail users. The seven largest
distributors serve the largest metropolitan areas in the TVA service area.
These large distributors (e.g., Memphis Light, Gas and Water; Nashville
Electric Service) are quasi-governmental entities that are indirectly
controlled by the municipal governments in the regions they serve. In
addition, the network of local distributors includes several rural electric
cooperatives. 93 The retail sales of TVA's distribution utilities are not
controlled by state utility regulators, who are relegated to a bystander role
in decisions about power resources and retail rates.
The existence of local electric distribution utilities complicates the
relationships between the local governments and TVA. Unlike many
cities elsewhere, municipal governments in the TVA service area have an
electric distribution organization that is loosely affiliated with the city
89 Morgan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1939). The enacting
authority of the TVA shows no legislative intent to limit the power of the executive with respect to
removal, and in the absence of such intent, the power exists. Id.
90 ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, OUTSIDE THE LAW: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (Dec. 2009), https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/11/2009-12_OutsidetheLaw.pdf.
91 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 38.
92 Id. at 42 (describing assets); see also TVA at a Glance, TENN. VALLEY
AUTH.,
https://www.tva.gov/About-TVA/TVA-at-a-Glance (describing capacity output of various forms
of generation).
93 For a discussion of efforts to decarbonize rural electric cooperatives, see Gabe Pacyniak,
Greening the Old New Deal: ReformingRuralElectricity CooperativeGovernance, 85 Mo. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
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government. These distribution utilities have long-term contractual
commitments to acquire their power from TVA and have close working
relationships with TVA. In addition, they rely on the revenues from the
sale of electricity to pay employees and fund other activities. As a result,
each city within the TVA service area is notJust a customer and regulator
of an electric utility, but also has something approximating an ownership
interest in an electric utility.
In terms of retail customers, TVA's organic statute encourages it to
structure its power generation to enable it to provide power "at the lowest
possible rates" to domestic and rural customers, including industrial
customers.9 4 This could be a barrier to decarbonization if "cost" is
construed narrowly to exclude environmental costs, but the term has been
construed broadly by courts.95 In addition, the least cost provision could
be a prompt to increase renewable or clean energy if renewable or clean
electricity is less costly than fossil fuel-based electricity.96 In some
situations and some areas of the U.S., the marginal cost of operating a
wind or solar facility is less than the marginal cost of operating a coalfired facility.97 Trends in the cost of electric power generation thus may
increase pressure for adoption of low-carbon and renewable power
generating units. A 2017 report by the International Renewable Energy
Agency states that "by 2020, all the renewable power generation
technologies that are now in commercial use are expected to fall within

94 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 58 (1933) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831j)
("This policy is further declared to be that the projects herein provided for shall be considered
primarily as for the benefit of the people of the section as a whole and particularly the domestic and
rural consumers to whom the power can economically be made available, and accordingly sale to
and use by industry shall be a secondary purpose, to be utilized principally to secure a sufficiently
high load factor and revenue returns which will permit domestic and rural use at the lowest possible
rates and in such manner as to encourage increased domestic and rural use of electricity.").
95 See Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 58 (1933) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
831-83 lee). The Energy Policy Act adopted language about a "least cost planning process" that
provides flexibility to account for environmental issues in electricity planning decisions, 16
U.S.C.S. § 831m-1, and recent federal court decisions have interpreted the cost provision broadly.
Ky. Coal Ass'n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 804 F.3d 799, 802-03 (6th Cir. 2015); Ky. Coal Ass'n,
Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 68 F. Supp. 3d 685 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
96 In 2005, Congress also adopted language requiring that board members: "shall affirm support
for the objectives and missions, of the Corporation, including being a national leader in
technological innovation, low-cost power, and environmental stewardship." Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2005, 108 Pub. L. 447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2005). This section of the TVA's
authority was added as part of the 2005 Appropriations Act. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 108
Pub. L. 447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2005). See 16 U.S.C. § 831a (language added in the 2005
Appropriations Act).
97 See LAZARD, LAZARD'S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS VERSION 12.0 (Nov.
2018),
https://www.lazard.com/media/450784/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-120vfinal.pdf.
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the fossil fuel-fired cost range, with most at the lower end or undercutting
fossil fuels."98
Securities Disclosures. TVA issues publicly-traded debt and files
periodic reports with the SEC that disclose financial risks to
bondholders.99 TVA's 2018 annual report (known as a 10-K) discloses
several risk factors that are particularly relevant to its motivations to
decarbonize. For instance, TVA discloses that it faces financial risks from
"[s]ignificant reductions in demand for electricity produced through nonrenewable or centrally located generation sources that may result from,
among other things, economic downturns, increased energy efficiency
and conservation, increased utilization of distributed generation and
microgrids, and improvements in alternative generation and energy
storage.""oo The annual report acknowledges that overall trends toward
renewable energy (including wind turbines, solar cells, and distributed
energy) have reduced the demand for traditional power and appear to be
accelerating despite the absence of federal statutory or regulatory
requirements or regulatory measures by the states in the Southeast.o1
According to the annual report, "[t]he traditional business model for
power production, selling power from centrally located plants, is facing
pressure from a variety of sources, including the potential for selfgeneration by current or potential customers, new technologies such as
energy storage, and increased energy efficiency." 102
The report also acknowledges the importance of consumer preferences
that may push large businesses to focus on sustainability. 10 3 According to
the report, while the anti-cherry-picking provision in federal law does not
subject TVA to open-access transmission from other grids, TVA is not
immune from customer pressures. According to TVA, consumers are
becoming increasingly interested in generating their own power through
"Distributed Energy Resources", which may cause TVA to re-evaluate
the operation of its grid system."1' In particular, the appeal of alternative
technologies such as "large-scale energy storage, gas or wind turbines,
fuel cells, microturbines, solar cells, and distributed energy or storage

98 INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION COSTS

2017
19
(2018),
https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/IRENA_2017_PowerCosts_2018.pdf
IN

[hereinafter IRENA REPORT].

99

TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 38.
100 Id. at 6 (noting factors that could affect TVA's forward-looking statements).
101 Id.

Id. at 41.
Id.
104 Id. at 19-20. TVA acknowledges that the increased use of Distributed Energy Resources will
likely reduce its use of traditional generation resources. See also id. at 38-39.
102
103
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resources" may allow effective competition with TVA's traditional
power plants. "o This may place pressure on TVA to "allow consumers to
generate some of their own power requirements or purchase from other
suppliers,"10 and some customers may move to other providers
entirely.o' In its representations to investors, TVA thus recognizes that,
despite the insulation provided by federal law, it is not immune from the
pressures of private competition.10
TVA thus acknowledges that it will need to modify its offering mix of
power generation to remain competitive if this loss of customers
occurs. 109 TVA has indicated that it is adapting its generation mix to meet
the growing need for electricity generated by renewable sources110 and is
evaluating smaller, cleaner power sources.1' But its current "base case"
yields a carbon trajectory that will be far above the requirements of deep
decarbonization in the next two decades.1 12 In addition, TVA's 10-K
states that it has encouraged development of new energy and storage
systems, such as solar, wind, biomass, and low-impact hydroelectric
systems, across the Tennessee Valley through current and past offerings:
"As of September 30, 2018, the combined participation for all such
renewable solutions is approximately 450 MW of installed operating
capacity with nearly 134 MW of additional approved capacity.
Additionally, TVA contracts for approximately 1,215 MW of operating
wind capacity from outside the Tennessee Valley via power purchase
agreements." 1 13 For comparison, Georgia Power, which sells less
electricity than TVA, has about 2,800 MW renewable capacity. As
discussed in Part I, TVA's mix of generation sources has resulted in a
carbon intensity that will be roughly in line with deep decarbonization
over the next decade but will, without additional commitments, begin to
exceed the deep decarbonization trajectory by 2030 and will be well
above the trajectory by 2038.

105

Id.
Id. at 39.
107 Id.
108 The annual report states that "other utilities may use their own transmission lines to serve
customers within TVA's service area, and third parties are able to avoid the restrictions on serving
end-use customers by selling or leasing generating assets to a customer rather than selling
electricity. These threats underscore the need for TVA to strategically price its products and
services and design rates to be competitive. There have also been some efforts in the past to erode
the anti-cherry picking provision, and the protection of the anti-cherry picking provision could be
limited and perhaps eliminated by federal legislation at some time in the future." Id. at 19.
109 Id. at 39.
110 Id. at 38.
111 Id. at 20.
112 Id.
113 Id.
106
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B.

The Prospectsfor National or SubnationalRegulation

TVA has an unusual legal status that insulates it to some extent from
democratic control over most of its energy investment, operation, and
pricing decisions, but it is subject to typical federal environmental
requirements. To a more limited extent, it is also subject to state and local
environmental controls. Part II.B examines the extent to which the federal
government or the states and cities in the TVA service area are likely to
adopt laws, policies, and programs that will induce TVA to decarbonize
more rapidly. It suggests that although the federal government and the
TVA-area states are unlikely to generate substantial pressure on TVA in
the near term, climate mitigation actions by states outside the TVA
service area and by cities in the area may have some effect.
1. FederalAction
If we assume that responding to climate change is something that a
democratically accountable national government would do, then the
natural place to turn is to the federal legislative and executive branches.
Bipartisan climate legislation was introduced by John McCain and Joe
Lieberman in the 2000s, but it never gained traction in Congress,"' and
the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill passed in the House of
Representatives in 2009 but died in the Senate.115 Recent legislative
proposals have included a national carbon tax and the Green New Deal,
but the near-term prospects for both look bleak. New legislation probably
will require a supportive president, and the Iowa Electronic Market, a
remarkably accurate predictor of many recent elections, suggests
substantial uncertainty about the outcome in 2020.116 In addition,
legislation will require not only control of the House of Representatives
by a party that places a high priority on climate mitigation, but 60 votes
in the Senate to overcome a filibuster and 66 votes in the event of a
presidential veto. The Senate barrier is perhaps the greatest of these
hurdles. A recent study suggests that population shifts away from rural
states have created a situation in which states with less than 20% of the
US population control over 50 votes in the Senate, and the voters in many

114

Amanda Little, The climate bill lost out, but the environment may yet prove the winner,

GRIST (Nov. 5, 2003), https://grist.org/article/thrill/.
115 Congress Climate History, CENTER FOR

CLIMATE

AND

ENERGY

SOLUTIONS,

https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-climate-history/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
116 Cassie Philips, Jonathan M. Gilligan, Stephen Harper, Jackie Roberts, & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Dialogue: Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change,
48 ENVTL. L. REP. 11049 (2018). For a discussion of election markets and climate change, see
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Kaitlin Toner Raimi, & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Energy and Climate
Change: A Climate PredictionMarket, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962 (2014).
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of these states tend to oppose climate mitigation.HI The current 5-4 divide
in the Supreme Court suggests that climate legislative and regulatory
measures will get a searching review by the Court, and if President Trump
is reelected, the 5-4 split may easily expand to 6-3 or 7-2. 11
The prospect of executive branch regulatory action also holds out
limited hope for major climate mitigation measures. Comprehensive
regulations that target greenhouse gases, mercury, and other pollutants
under the Clean Air Act could reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, as
could a range of executive orders relating to reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions, federal procurement of low carbon goods, and other issues.
These measures could affect TVA by imposing direct emissions
reduction requirements and by affecting the demand for low-carbon
power from TVA's customers and investors. The regulatory rollbacks by
the Trump administration, however, have demonstrated the vulnerability
of executive branch actions. Although the 2020 election and increasing
concern over climate control may prompt further federal regulation of
TVA, it is unclear whether a new president of either party would pursue
the regulatory measures necessary to achieve deep decarbonization and
whether those regulatory actions would survive judicial review.
2. State RegulatoryActions
Roughly half of the states have taken major steps to reduce carbon
emissions. For instance, at least twenty-four states have committed to
2 6- 2 8

%

policies that in the aggregate should reduce their emissions by

from 2005 levels by 2025 (consistent with the U.S. commitment to the
Paris Agreement).119 Together, these states represent 55% of the U.S.
population and an $11.7 trillion economy.120 In addition, the trend is
toward more aggressive long-term commitments and actions. Four states
(California, Washington, Hawaii, and New Mexico) have committed to
100% clean or renewable energy by 2050 or earlier,12 1 and New York has
committed to carbon neutrality by 2050, with a requirement of 70%

117 See Orts, supra note 2.

118 See Paul Starr, Trump's Second Term, THE ATLANTIC
(May 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/.
119 States Unitedfor Climate Action, supra note 29.
120 2019
Fact
Sheet,
U.S.
CLIMATE
ALLIANCE
(2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a4cfbfel8b27d4da21c9361/t/5ccb5aa56e9a7f542fe4233c/
1556830885910/USCA+Factsheet_April+2019.pdf.
121 Nathan Rott, Going Zero Carbon'Is All The Rage. But Will It Slow Climate Change?, NPR
(June 18, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/18/724343789/going-zero-carbon-is-all-the-ragebut-will-it-slow-climate-change.
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renewable electricity generation by 2030.122 California has led the nation
in its efforts to implement policies to achieve its climate goals, including
a cap-and-trade program, automotive standards, and other measures. 12 3
Yet with few exceptions, the states in the TVA service area have not
pursued climate mitigation efforts. Several TVA-area states actively
litigated to oppose the Obama-era Clean Power Plan.124 North Carolina
and Virginia are the only TVA-area states to join the U.S. Climate
Alliance, 125 and only a small slice of TVA's service area is in these
states.126 Furthermore, North Carolina and South Carolina are the only
states in the region with renewable portfolio targets. State targets serve
an important symbolic role, but the TVA Act's preemption of state
regulatory control over energy resource investments makes it unclear
whether TVA would be required to comply with state targets that exceed

its own voluntary goals. 12 7
Although the state governments within the TVA service area are not a
likely source of legislative or regulatory pressure for emissions
reductions, the policies in states outside of the TVA service area may
have important effects on TVA. States such as California or New York,
for example, have challenged large corporations to apply more stringent
regulatory requirements to their operations in other jurisdictions. 128 As
the recent agreement by several automakers to voluntarily apply the
California tailpipe standards nationwide suggests, corporations with
national or global operations may choose to adopt California-compliant
carbon emissions reductions strategies across all of their operations.

"

122 Jesse McKinley & Brad Plumer, New York to Approve One of the World's Most Ambitious
Climate
Plans,
N.Y.
TIES
(June
18,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/greenhouse-gases-ny.html.
123 See Ann E. Carlson, The Trump Administration'sAssault on California'sGlobal Climate
Leadership, 112 AM. J. INTL L. UNBOUND 269 (2018); Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. Climate Change
Policy:
Made
in
California,
N.Y.
TIES
(Sept.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/climate/california-climate-change.html.
124 Fifteen US States Seek to Block Obama's Clean Power Plan, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/enviromnent/2015/aug/14/fifteen-us-states-seek-blockobamas-clean-power-plan.
125 After President Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, seventeen states formed the
U.S. Climate Alliance, an effort designed to reduce carbon emissions. See States Unitedfor Climate
Action, supra note 29. Virginia adopted major new climate legislation in 2020 that will accelerate
the decarbonization of its electricity grid. See Sarah Rankin, VirginiaLawmakers Send "Historic
Energy
Bill
to
Governor,
AP
(Mar.
6,
2020),
https://apnews.com/c2c7dcd9l32d496a9879cbccfdl 36a0d.
126 See TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83.
127 See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS
(Feb.
1,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfoliostandards.aspx.
128 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AAND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL EcoNOMY (1995).
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These out-of-area requirements can lead to increased renewable or clean
energy demand, especially by large customers with nationwide
operations, and increased electrification of TVA-area vehicles, facilities,
and suppliers. Thus, even if most of the states in the TVA service area do
not follow suit, policies by California and other governments outside the
TVA area may create incentives for TVA to decarbonize.
3. Local GovernmentAction
Local governments, including local distribution utilities that purchase
their power from TVA, are an increasingly likely source of motivation
for TVA to accelerate its decarbonization efforts. The voting patterns of
citizens in larger TVA-area cities suggest far more support for climate
mitigation than the voting patterns at the state level.129 As mentioned
above, even if city policymakers are not motivated by public support for
climate mitigation, they may favor decarbonization out of economic
competitiveness concerns: they may be concerned that regions with
electric grids that are out of sync with the 80 by 50 pathway will be at a
disadvantage when competing with other regions for business recruitment
and retention, tourism, and other economic development opportunities. 130
Local governments could affect TVA's motivations to decarbonize in
several ways. 131 For instance, local governments within the TVA service
area could insist on purchasing renewable power for their own operations;
adopt renewable power goals for all of the power users in their geographic
areas; and adopt laws, policies, and programs to achieve these goals. 132
Policymakers could also pursue similar programs for energy efficiency
and conservation or appoint board members for the local electric
distribution utility who would pursue decarbonization initiatives. In
addition, as we discussed above, even if governments within the TVA
service area do not adopt decarbonization measures, actions by
129 See 2016 District-by-DistrictState Legislative Control, supra note 22; see Jennifer
Marlon,
Peter Howe, Matto Mildenberger, Anthony Leiserowitz & Xinran Wang, Yale Climate Opinion
Maps 2018, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC'N. (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-datalycom-us2018/?est-happening&type-value&geo-county.
130 See CDP, IT TAKES A CITY: THE CASE FOR COLLABORATIVE CLIMATE ACTION (2016),
https://b8f65cb373b lb7b l5febc70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7cO3fcddld.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/00 1/172/
original/CDPThematic-Report 2016.pdf.
131 IRENA lists five key roles of cities in promoting renewable energy: vision setting and
planning, direct purchase and control, norms and regulations, financing, advocacy and facilitation.
IRENA REPORT, supra note 98.
132 For general discussion of local government prerogatives to adopt their own clean energy
initiatives, especially in the context of land use management, see Jim Rossi & Chris Serkin, Energy
Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643 (2019).
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governments outside the service area could increase the economic and
social pressure for decarbonization within it.
A brief review of national trends among cities and recent activity
within the TVA service area suggests that local government pressure for
decarbonization is growing. Many cities and local governments in the
U.S. have made climate or renewables commitments.13 3 For instance,
over 167 U.S. mayors have signed onto the Global Covenant of Mayors
for Climate and Energy, which commits cities to achieving the goals of
the Paris Agreement. 134 In addition, 1,066 U.S. cities have signed onto the
Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement, which commits them to meet or
beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their communities while also urging
their state and federal government to do the same.135 Further, 133 cities
have committed to the Sierra Club's "Ready for 100" initiative, which
encourages cities to move to 100% clean and renewable energy. 136 This
initiative recognizes all commitments to 100% renewable energy and
offers recommended target years and planning processes. 137 Over 100
U.S. cities have designated a future date to achieve 100% renewable
energy. 1 38 In addition, in 2019 former New York Mayor Michael
Bloomberg committed $500 million to lobby for local government and
other officials to close the remaining 231 coal plants in the U.S. 1 3 9
Only a few of the cities in the TVA service area participate in national
climate initiatives. No cities in TVA's service area have joined the Sierra
Club Ready for 100 commitment,14 0 and no cities in TVA's service area
have made the United States Conference of Mayors list for city-wide

133 See Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks: Local Climate Change
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409 (2008); BlOOMBERG PHLANTHROPIES, FULFILLING AMERICA'S
PLEDGE
(2018),
https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2018/09/Fulfilling-Americas-Pledge2018.pdf.
134 Global Covenant of Mayorsfor Climate & Energy: United States, GLOBAL COVENANT OF
MAYORS FOR CLMATE & ENERGY, https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/region/usa/ (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019). Data is current as of April 2020.
135 Mayors

Climate

Protection Agreement,

THE

U.S.

CONFERENCE

OF

MAYORS,

https://www.usmayors.org/mayors-climate-protection-center/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). Data is
current as of April 2020.
136 100%
Commitments
in
Cities,
Counties,
&
States,
SIERRA
CLUB,
https://www.sierraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
137
138

Id.
Id.

139 Lisa Friedman, Michael Bloomberg Promises$500 Million to Help End Coal, N.Y. TIMES
(June
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/climate/bloomberg-climate-pledgecoal.html.
140 See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 136; About TVA, TENN. VALLEY AUTH.,
https://www.tva.gov/About-TVA (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Nashville's renewables commitment
may enable it to qualify. See discussion infra note 142.
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renewable goals or cities in progress as of mid-2019. "' Several recent
actions by cities in the TVA service area, however, signal that cities in
the area are becoming more focused on decarbonization. Nashville,
Tennessee, is one of the two largest TVA-area cities, and its local
distributor, Nashville Electric Service, is a major local distributor of TVA
power. Several recent actions by the Nashville government will ramp up
pressure on TVA over the next two decades. The last two mayors have
made major climate commitments,142 and the current Mayor, John
Cooper, has joined the Global Covenant of Mayors. 14 3 Perhaps most
important, the Nashville city council passed a bill establishing renewable
energy procurement goals for the city, including a plan that requires the
Nashville government to procure 100% renewable energy by 2041.'
141 The United States Conference of Mayors maintains a list of cities with city-wide renewable
goals and cities in progress. See Cities with city-wide renewable energy goals (including
commercial and residential), THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/0 1/Cities-with-city-wide-renewable-energy-goals.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
142 In June 2016, Nashville Mayor Megan Barry signed the Statement from the Climate Mayors
in Response to President Trump's Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, and she joined
the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, which commits the city to meeting the
goals of the Paris Agreement by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and limiting further global
temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Climate Mayors, 407 US Climate Mayors commit to
adopt, honor and uphold Paris Climate Agreement goals, MEDIUM (June 1, 2017), available at
https://medium.com/@ClimateMayors/climate-mayors-commit-to-adopt-honor-and-uphold-parisclimate-agreement-goals-ba566e260097. After Mayor Barry resigned in 2018, David Briley
become the interim mayor and committed "to implementing science-informed CO2-reduction goals
for the city as outlined by the Livable Nashville Committee's Climate and Energy Subcommittee."
Mayor Briley Marks Earth Day by Announcing Let's Move Nashville is Equivalent to Planting]
Million Trees, NASHVWLE.GOV (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.nashville.gov/News-Media/NewsArticle/ID/7443/Mayor-Briley-Marks-Earth-Day-by-Announcing-Lets-Move-Nashville-isEquivalent-to-Planting-1-Million-Trees.aspx. The goals commit the city to reducing GHG
emissions from Nashville Metro government operations by 20% by 2020, 40% by 2030, and 80%
by 2050, and citywide emissions by 10% by 2020, 30% by 2030, and 70% by 2050. Id. The goals
also commit the city to installing 10MW of renewable energy by 2020 (energy from renewables
increased to 30%by 2030). Id.
143 Mayor Cooper signed the Global Covenant of Mayors, which is a precursor to participating
in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, and he committed to "work toward reducing
Nashville's community-scale emissions 30 percent by 2030 and 70 percent by 2050. To lead by
example, CO2-reduction targets for Metro Government will be 40 percent by 2030 and 80 percent
by 2050. Using Nashville's most recent emissions inventories as a baseline, these targets were
developed upon surveying those adopted by peer and aspirational cities and align with sciencebased recommendations in the Paris Climate Accord to reduce absolute CO2 emissions by three
percent annually until 2050 in order to hold global warming to 2'C." Chris Song, Mayor Cooper
Announces Multiple Initiatives to Combat Climate Change and Promote Sustainability Signs
Global Covenant ofMayors, NASHVILLE.GOV (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.nashville.gov/NewsMedia/News-Article/ID/91 33/Mayor-Cooper-Announces-Multiple-Initiatives-to-CombatClimate-Change-and-Promote-Sustainability-Signs-Global-Covenant-of-Mayors.aspx.
144 On June 4, 2019, Nashville passed Bill BL2019-1600 to establish a standard for the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and
Davidson Cty., Ordinance No. BL2019-1600 (2019) (as amended), available at
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Unless the city is willing to meet its goals by procuring renewable energy
credits, these goals will require more renewable power than the
generation mix envisioned by TVA's base case. The Nashville council
also adopted bills that require the electrification of the metro government
motor vehicle fleet and efficiency standards for metro government
buildings.
Although Nashville was the first city in the TVA territory to commit
to a renewable energy goal, other important movement has recently
occurred among some of TVA's largest municipal utility customers. For
instance, in 2019 Knoxville set comparable goals, and the recentlyelected Knoxville mayor also has signaled support for climate mitigation
and renewable power.146 Memphis Light, Gas and Water, the largest of
the local distribution utilities in the TVA service area, has signaled that it
may defect from the grid, at least in part because of concerns about the
inability to procure sufficient amounts of renewable power from TVA. "'
Other major cities in the TVA service area have large groups of
progressive voters and a history of taking more pro-environmental steps
than their respective state governments, and they may follow the lead of
Nashville and the other cities. 1' In addition, if renewable energy becomes
the cheapest option for meeting local energy needs, widespread voter
climate mitigation support may not be needed to spark this change.
https://www.nashville.gov/Metro-Clerk/Legislative/Ordinances/Details/d3Oe0 174-6c6b-45d8b93a-05b5d285c76e/2015-2019/BL2019-1600.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Starting with
2020, "total carbon-free energy usage shall be not less than 53%, with not less than 20% from tier
one renewable sources, not less than 2 .5% from tier two renewable sources, and not less than 1%
from solar energy." Id. In 2041 "the percentage of total carbon-free energy usage shall be not less
than 100%, with not less than 100% from tier one renewable sources, not less than 0% from tier
two renewable sources, and not less than 10% from solar energy." Id. These goals are sufficient to
enable Nashville to become a member of the Sierra Club Ready for 100 initiative.
145 Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty., ORDINANCE No. BL2019-1598 (2019)
[hereinafter ORD. No. BL2019-1598].
146 In 2019, Knoxville Mayor Madeline Rogero announced goals of GHG emissions reductions
of 50% by 2030 and 80% by 2050. See Tyler Whetstone, Knoxville City Leaders Announce
Ambitious Climate Goals for 2030, 2050, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (June 5, 2019),
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/05/knoxville-green-thumb-city-leadersannounce-ambitious-climate-goals-2030-2050/127470300 1/. New Knoxville Mayor Indya
Kincannon has supported climate mitigation and renewable power efforts. See Knoxville Elects
Kincannon
as
New
Mayor,
TENNESSEE
TRIBUNE
(Nov.
7,
2019),
https://tntribune.com/community/local/knoxville/knoxville-elects-kincannon-as-new-mayor/.
147 David Flessner, Memphis Light Gas & Water studies leaving TVA, eyes energy options,
TIMES
FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
24,
2019),
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2019/feb/24/memphstudiesleaving-tvamlgw-eyes-energy-opti/489158/.
148 See James Bruggers, Cities Pressure TVA to Boost Renewable Energy as Memphis Weighs
Breaking
Away,
INSIDECLIMATE
NEwS
(Apr.
30,
2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/30042019/tva-renewable-energy-memphis-nashvilleknoxville-climate-change-coal-costs.
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III. PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

Given the limited federal and state pressure on TVA, could other actors
motivate TVA to accelerate its decarbonization glide path? Part III
suggests that the answer is yes. In addition to pressure from local
governments and from states outside the TVA area, private governance
initiatives may be able to harness support from a combination of
investors, major corporate and institutional customers, and households.
Private governance initiatives draw on many of the same regulatory tools
or instruments as government initiatives: prescription, property, market
leveraging, tradeable permit regimes, information, procurement, and
insurance.149 For many sectors and regions, private actors, whether nongovernmental organizations, philanthropists, corporations, or other
private organizations, use these tools when seeking to achieve
environmental and other social goals, but to date no organization has
developed a major utility-focused private governance initiative in the
Southeast. Part III examines how an initiative that utilizes these tools may
motivate TVA to accelerate its decarbonization efforts.
A. The Private Drivers ofDecarbonization
As we discussed above, TVA's 2018 10-K provides a roadmap to
major concerns that may affect its decision making regarding
decarbonization. In its 10-K, TVA acknowledged the importance of its
ability to attract investors for its bonds,"o and it repeated statements made
in earlier annual reports indicating that reductions in electricity demand
arising from efficiency and conservation pose a material risk. " TVA also
disclosed a new type of material risk: distributed generation and
consumer preferences for renewable energy.152
Dozens of private climate mitigation initiatives have emerged in the
last decade, and they have used a mix of tools,

15 3

but information,

prescriptive standards, procurement, and market leveraging are the most

149 See Light & Orts, supra note 6, at 13, tbl.1 (identifying as instruments used by public and
private governance prescription, property, market leveraging, tradeable permit regimes,

information, procurement, and insurance). See also Roy Boyd, Kerry Krutilla, & W. Kip Viscusi,
Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument to Reduce C02 Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1995) (identifying instruments); JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H.
THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 44-52 (5th ed. 2013); James Salzman, Teaching
Policy Instrument Choice in EnvironmentalLaw: The Five Ps, 23 DuKE ENVTL. L. POL'Y F. 363
(2013).
150 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 38.
152

Id.
Id.

153

Light & Orts, supra note 6, at 2-5, 12-13.
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important for TVA-related decarbonization efforts."' The discussion
below explores how these tools could be used in a private initiative
focused on TVA decarbonization.
B. Supply Side Pressure
1. Bondholders
Private initiatives that increase investor pressure may motivate TVA
to accelerate its decarbonization and development of renewable power.
According to its 2018 10-K, as of mid-2018 TVA had over $20 billion"'
in outstanding debt. When TVA's long-term debt matures, TVA typically
refinances by issuing new debt.156 TVA's portfolio has diverse maturity
times and a long average life that in some cases extends beyond 2030,
when the gap may begin to emerge between TVA's emissions trajectory
and the 80 by 50 pathway.15' As of September 30, 2018, the average life
of TVA's debt portfolio was 16.3 years.158 In 2017, the average life was
16.6 years. 159 In the next five years, roughly $6 billion of TVA's debt, or
just under 30%, will mature, suggesting that TVA will either be paying
down substantial amounts of debt or actively selling new debt
instruments.
TVA Bondholders. The typical understanding of corporate debt is that
bondholders trade governance rights for less investment risk. In response
to changes in bond markets, however, including more frequent trading by
bondholders, scholars have noted the importance of integrating
bondholders into corporate decision making, especially when reducing

154 VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 4, at ch. 4 (discussing
emergence of private environmental governance responses to climate change). The instrument less
often used in the climate mitigation area is property, such as the creation of internal corporate
property rights in water use, etc., to improve management. Land conservation efforts may fit into
this category, however. See Vandenbergh, supra note 6. Insurance is another instrument that is
growing in importance for private climate mitigation initiatives. Major insurance companies such
as Allianz and Chubb have recently announced plans to stop insuring firms that rely on coal. See
Allianz, Statement on Coal-Based Business Models, ALLIANZ.COM (updated Sept. 2018),
https://www.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianzcom/migration/media/press/d
ocument/Allianz-statement-on-coal-based-modelsEN.pdf; Chubb cuts coal insurance exposure
because of climate change, BBC (July 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-488083 11.
Although promising tools, property, market leveraging and insurance are beyond the scope of this
Article.
155 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 57.
156 Id. at 79.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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systemic risks.160 These insights are particularly important for an entity
such as TVA that relies on bond financing. Even with more frequent
trading, the generally long investment horizon of bondholders may
motivate them to focus on ways to reduce future emissions-related
liabilities and to avoid risks associated with an emissions gap that may
begin in roughly a decade and continue over the following two decades.
Many of TVA's bonds are held by large institutional investors. 161 Some
bondholders may be interested in TVA's emissions trajectory only if the
trajectory affects TVA's financial condition, and TVA's 10-K identifies
several tangible ways in which this may occur.162 For instance, the 10-K
discloses that TVA's material risks, such as emerging consumer
preferences for renewable energy, may in turn reduce demand for power
and may affect TVA's future debt and planning. Similarly, bondholders
may be interested in the financial implications of the mismatch between
TVA's emissions trajectory and the commitments of major city,
corporate, and other institutional customers.
Some bondholders may also be interested in TVA's emissions
trajectory if it is perceived to be inconsistent with the bondholders'
environmental or social commitments and thus poses reputational risks to
the bondholders. In recent years, large numbers of major institutional
investors have signed onto one or more environmental, social, and
governance ("ESG") platforms-a trend that is expected to continue to
160 For discussion, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governancefor Bondholder
Financed, Systemically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1345 (2017).
161 Data available from Bloomberg makes it possible to identify the bondholders of corporations

with publicly traded securities, including TVA. The analysis is based on TVA 2018 10-K and
findings from Bloomberg Terminal. The Bloomberg Terminal data are publicly available, but the
data mustbe purchased. Bloomberg Terminal maintains data related to TVA bonds and the research
was conducted in June 2019. In the Terminal, the researcher conducted a search for TVA. The
researcher then selected "major creditors" and then "aggregate debt." Finally, the researcher
changed the debt inclusion to "current issuer" instead of "current issuer and all direct subsidiaries."
From here, Bloomberg provided a list of all current TVA bondholders and their respective amounts
held. Based on this initial analysis, thirty-three of TVA's 338 current bondholders have committed
to at least one form of ESG (environmental, social governance) initiative indicating an interest in
environmental impacts, totaling 9.76%. These institutional investors that have signed initiatives
tend to be those with greater amounts held. Using Bloomberg's debt number, 12.5% of TVA's
bondholder debt belongs to those with an ESG commitment. Using the 2018 10-K debt amount,
10.53% of TVA's debt belongs to those bondholders.
162 On June 26, 2019, Moody's confirmed TVA's AAA Stable rating, indicating that TVA is
capable of meeting its current financial commitments. Approximately $22.0 billion of debt
securities
affected,
MOODY'S
INV.
SERV.
(June
26,
2019),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-affirms-Tennessee-Valley-Authoritys-TVA-Aaasenior-unsecured-ratings PR 403576. TVA received "low dependence" because of its "protected
monopoly position." It also received "high probability of government support" because of its
importance to the Tennessee Valley since 1933. Moody's believes TVA can generate "significant
free cash flows" to decrease its debt, but TVA's AAA rating could be affected by changes in
regulations that remove TVA's protected position. Id.
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grow. 163 These ESG platforms do not require the bondholders to commit
to invest only in organizations with specific climate mitigation policies,
much less deep decarbonization efforts. Several specifically target GHG
emissions, though, and they all are an indication that these institutional
investors are interested in a broad range of environmental attributes of
their borrowers. As of mid-2019, our analysis suggests that roughly 10%
(33/338) of all TVA bondholders, holding roughly 10% of TVA's debt,164
participated in at least one ESG platform. 165 Although 10% of the value
of TVA's bonds is already substantial, this percentage will grow if the
recent trend toward increased institutional investor interest in ESG issues
continues.
In its 2018 annual report, TVA acknowledged the risk posed by
bondholder environmental concerns: "certain investors use the
environmental impact or sustainability of an industry as a criterion for
deciding whether to invest in that industry. TVA's use of fossil fuels or
nuclear power could lead such investors to not purchase TVA Bonds."166
These concerns may affect investors not only because of specific criteria
used in screening investments, such as reliance on fossil fuels, but also
may affect the organization's overall reputation, and TVA's annual report
affirms the importance of its reputation to investors.16 7 Table 2 lists
several major investor ESG initiatives that TVA bondholders participate
in and briefly describes the focus of each.

163 See Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARv. Bus.
REV.,
May-June 2019, at 106 (describing commitments to ESG by managers of large institutional
investors).
164 Roughly 10% to 12% of all TVA bondholder debt is held by these institutions.
165 Roughly 28% of TVA's debt will mature in the next five years.
166 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 40.
167 Id. at 41 ("As with any company, TVA's reputation is a vital element of its ability to
effectively conduct its business. TVA's reputation could be harmed by a variety of factors,
including the failure of a generating asset or supporting infrastructure, failure to effectively manage
land and other natural resources entrusted to TVA, real or perceived violations of environmental
regulations, real or perceived issues with TVA's safety culture or work environment, significant
delays in construction projects, acts or omissions of TVA management, the perception of such acts
or omissions, measures taken to offset reductions in demand, or a significant dispute with one of
TVA's customers. Any deterioration in TVA's reputation may harm TVA's relationships with its
customers and stakeholders, may increase TVA's cost of doing business, may interfere with its
ability to attract and retain a skilled workforce, and may potentially lead to the enactment of new
laws and regulations, or the modification of existing laws and regulations, that negatively affect the
way TVA conducts its business.")

Virginia EnvironmentalLaw Journal

36

[Vol. 38: 1

Table 2. Investor ESG Platforms

Climate

Action

100+169

ESG
Research
7
Australia"'

Eumedio n171

Global
Impact
Investing
Network
("GHIIN ") 1-

Climate Action 100+ is a tive-year initiative made
up of 320 investors with goals of implementing a
strong governance framework, reducing GHG
emissions across the value chain, and providing
enhanced corporate disclosure. Climate Action 100+
engages with members to find solutions to the
climate crisis.
Members commit to requesting that their
Australian fund managers include ESG in their panel
structures. ESG RA conducts stockbroker research
focused on ESG issues.
Eumedion
hosts symposia for members,
influences Dutch legislation, and encourages
consultation between investors. Its goal is to increase
sustainability in corporate governance across
Europe.
GllN focuses on using activities, education, and
research to help reduce the barriers to impact
investing and improve the evidence base for the
investing industry. Membership provides resources
so that investors can allocate capital to find solutions
to the world's challenges.

168 Ceres
Investor
Network on
Climate Risk and Sustainability, CERES,
https://www.ceres.org/networks/ceres-investor-network (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
169 Climate Action 100+, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/initiatives/climate-action-100
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2019).
170 ESG Research Australia Membership, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
ASSOCIATION
AUSTRALASIA, https://responsibleinvestment.org/about-us/esgra/membership/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
171 Deelnemers, EUMEDION, https://www.eumedion.nl/nl/deelnemers (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
172 Current Members, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, https://thegiin.org/currentmembers (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
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Green
Bond
GBP is a voluntary guideline process for issuing
7
Principles ("GBP")"'
green bonds, and any organization that has issued,
underwritten, or invested in a Green, Social, or
Sustainability Bond can become a member. The
guidelines focus on 1) use of proceeds, 2)
evaluation/selection of bonds, 3) management of
proceeds, and 4) transparent and accurate reporting.
Institutional
JlGCC's Investor Practices program hosts a forum
Investors Group on for collaboration with the goal of implementing
Climate
Change better practices for investors related to climate risks
7
("llGCC")"'
and opportunities. This program is developed from
the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures ("TCFD").
SASB provides opportunities for members to
Sustainability
Accounting
learn about financial impacts of ESG issues and
Standards
Board supports members in developing internal best
75
("SASB")s

practices.

Bondholder interest may affect TVA's decision-making in several
ways. On an ongoing basis, TVA managers may respond if current
investors monitor and communicate their preferences about ESG issues
with their borrowers. This is a common practice among SRI investors;
recently, this type of ongoing investor attention and communication with
firms has begun to occur even among non-SRI investors. One example is
a letter from the head of BlackRock, the largest institutional investor in
the world, to corporate managers seeking information on plans for
climate mitigation. 176 Similarly, ESG issues may influence TVA decision
making about decarbonization by affecting the market for bonds,
including TVA's debt.

173 Membership, INT'L CAPITAL MKT. ASS'N, https://www.icmagroup.org/green-social-andsustainability-bonds/membership/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
174 Our Members, THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GROUP ON CLMATE CHANGE,
https://www.iigcc.org/about-us/our-members/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
175 SASB Alliance OrganizationalMembers, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/alliance-membership/organizational-members/ (last visited Oct. 13,
2019).
176 Press Release, Investors Underappreciate Climate-Related Risks in Their PortfoliosBlackRock
Report,
BLACKROCK
(Apr.
4,
2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/article/corporate-one/pressreleases/investors-underappreciate-climate-related-risks-in-their-portfolios; see also BlackRock
Environmental
Sustainability,
BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/responsibility/environmental-sustainability
(last visited
March 4, 2020).
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PrivateInitiatives. A 2019 NGO-organized initiative that focused on
the global cement industry provides an example of how private investors
might target their decarbonization initiatives at TVA or other utilities in
the Southeast. The cement industry is one of the largest GHG-emitting
sectors in the world, accounting for 7% of global emissions, and it has
been the target of a number of naming-and-shaming campaigns by deep
green environmental groups.1 Recently, a bright green NGO, the
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, worked with Ceres and
other NGOs to induce ten investors with more than $2 trillion in assets
under management to pressure the cement industry to more fully disclose
climate risks and to commit to carbon neutrality by 2050.178 This investorcentered initiative used several private governance tools, including
market leveraging in the form of pressure from investors and information
disclosure to motivate action. The initiative also included a call for
companies to adopt carbon emissions commitments and to impose
emissions requirements on suppliers. Although the cement industry is
unlikely to adopt these recommendations in toto, this type of pressure
from investors is difficult for companies to ignore.
2. CorporateCustomers
Bondholders on their own cannot require TVA to decarbonize, but
TVA is already responding to pressure from some of its current customers
regarding carbon emissions. TVA offers existing customers several
options for purchasing renewable power, 179 and it has acknowledged
customers' interest in the carbon intensity or carbon footprint of the

177

23,

Avery Ellfeldt, Investors Call Out Concrete Firms on CarbonFootprint, GREENWIRE (July
2019),

https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2019/07/23/stories/1060778739?show_login=1&t-https%/`3A
%2F/o2Fwww.eenews.net%/`2Fgreenwire%/02F2019%/`2FO7%/`2F23%/`2Fstories%/`2F1060778739.

178 See THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INVESTOR
EXPECTATIONS OF COMPANIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS SECTOR (2019) [hereinafter
INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS]; Brendan Coyne, Decarbonise or Risk Divestment, Investors Warn
Cement Makers, THE ENERGYST (July 22, 2019), https://theenergyst.com/decarbonise-or-

divestment-investors-wam-big-cement/.
179 Valley Renewable Energy for Business & Industry, TENN.
VALLEY AUTH.,
https://www.tva.gov/Energy/Valley-Renewable-Energy/Valley-Renewables-For-BusinessIndustry (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). TVA allows customers to pay for EnergyRight@. Monthly $4
investments guarantee 150 kilowatts of clean, renewable energy added to the grid. TVA also offers
Green Power Providers (GPP) for small-scale (up to 50 kW) projects across the valley. GPP
participants are paid for each kWh generated. Forbusinesses, TVA offers Green Power Switch and
the GPP program. TVA sells Renewable Energy Certificates to companies, allowing businesses to
obtain the legal right of generated energy. TVA also offers investments in solar photovoltaic
energy, between 50 kW and 2 MW. Id.
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electricity they buy."1o According to TVA, companies ask for such data
because some product markets and investors are responding to their own
customers' and other investors' demands for carbon footprint
information. "' In response, TVA has developed a "Carbon
Competitiveness" policy, which assists its customers in accounting for
the carbon associated with the electricity they use. TVA has developed a
customer-specific carbon-footprint model to enable it to tailor its
responses to specific customers instead of giving customers the average
emissions from the TVA grid.
Customer pressure is particularly salient when it comes from corporate
customers. These corporations can account for carbon in facility siting
decisions and are affected by their reputation on a national or
international scale. Nearly two-thirds of TVA's generated electricity
supplies commercial and industrial buyers in the Tennessee Valley, either
through local utility partners or through TVA's direct-service contracts
with large industrial customers.182 Because energy supply is often a
primary concern for corporate buyers, especially those considering
additional investments in the Tennessee Valley, one of TVA's most
important functions is to support economic development in the area by
responding to corporate energy demand. In recent years, corporate buyers
have increasingly demanded renewable energy, placing TVA's current
decarbonization pathway and renewables portfolio increasingly at odds
with the public commitments of many of its corporate customers. This
decarbonization and renewables deficit may reduce the region's ability to
retain existing corporate customers and attract new ones.
Existing TVA Corporate Customers. Many large corporations have set
targets for renewable energy use or GHG emission reductions. For
instance, nearly half (48%) of the Fortune 500 had a climate or energy
target in 2016, up 5% from 2014. Although most of these targets address
GHG emissions generally, rather than clean or renewable power,
companies often rely on procurement of renewable energy to meet both
types of goals. A review of the 2018 Fortune Global 500 suggests that 21
of 126 U.S. companies (17%) and 30 of 374 foreign companies (8%) have
also committed to 100% renewable energy (defined as biomass,

180 More on the model can be found on TVA's website. Carbon Competitiveness, TENN.
VALLEY

AUTH.,

https://www.tva.com/newsroom/articles/carbon-competitiveness

(last visited

April 24, 2020).
181 Id.
182 See U.S. Energy Infornation Administration,Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form
EIA-861 detaileddatafiles (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ [hereinafter
USEIA Form 861 TVA Sales Data].
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geothermal, solar, water, or wind sources, but not nuclear or
hydroelectric). 183
The motivations for these corporate targets are varied, but they often
include tangible business benefits such as reduced operating costs and
long-term price stability. In 2016, 190 members of the Fortune 500
collectively reported $3.7 billion in annual savings from projects
associated with their renewable energy and greenhouse gas emissions
targets.1"' Companies are also acting in response to significant
reputational risk. Alphabet, the parent of Google, has indicated that "not
addressing climate change risks and impacts head on could result in a
reduced demand for our goods and services because of negative
reputation impact."18 5

Many types of companies set environmental goals. Although large
corporations like Facebook, Google, and Walmart earn the most press for
their environmental commitments, somewhat smaller companies are
setting goals as well. In 2016, 44% of the bottom quintile of the Fortune
500 had a commitment, compared to 63% of the 100 largest companies
in the country. 18 6 Commitments are also spread across many industries.
Of the eleven sectors represented in the Fortune 500, more than half of
the companies in six of the sectors have made environmental
commitments. Energy is the only sector that falls significantly behind the
others, with only 11% of companies making commitments.1 7
Our analysis suggests that Fortune 500 companies headquartered in the
Tennessee Valley lagged only slightly behind the national average in
environmental target-setting in 2016, with 40% of such companies setting
some sort of emissions or renewables goal."' In addition, TVA formally
targets a selection of industries for economic development, which include
four of the six sectors most likely to make environmental commitments
(consumer staples, materials, industrials, and information technology)
and only one of the five trailing sectors (consumer discretionary).18 9
183
184

RE 100 Overview, RE100, http://therel00.org/rel00 (lastvisited Oct. 15, 2019).
CDP, CALVERT RES. AND MGMT., CERES, & WWF, POWER FORWARD 3.0: HOW THE

LARGEST U.S. COMPANIES ARE CAPTURING BUSINESS

VALUE WHILE ADDRESSING CLIMATE

CHANGE

(2017),

http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/1049/files/original/PowerForward_3.0_April_2017_-_Digital_SecondFinal.pdf.
185

CDP,

MAJOR RISK OR RosY OPPORTUNITY,

ARE COMPANIES READY FOR CLIMATE

(2019),
https://6fefcbb86e61aflb2fc4c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7cO3fcddld.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/004/588/
original/CDPClimateChange report 2019.pdf.
186 CDP, supra note 184.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
CHANGE?
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Historically strong Tennessee Valley industries like advanced
manufacturing, consumer products, and industrial products are among the
leading sectors on environmental commitments. Automobile and
automobile component manufacturing, some of the largest industries in
the TVA service area, fall in a trailing sector, but several of the
automotive firms that have located in the Tennessee Valley are among
those that have set environmental goals, including Volkswagen, Nissan,
and General Motors. 190
Commitments are only a first step toward emissions reductions, but
many corporations have achieved or are actively seeking to achieve their
commitments, often with oversight by environmental NGOs.19 1 Of the
large companies targeting 100% renewable energy, the average target
year is only seven years away.192 To meet impending commitments,
corporations have significantly ramped up their purchases of renewable
electricity. Fortune 500 companies have more than doubled their overall
green power procurement since 2014 (a subset of renewable energy not
including conventional sources like nuclear or hydropower), and twentytwo members of the Fortune 500 are already procuring at least 100% of
their total electricity usage from green power. 193 Momentum appears to
be building even as the federal government has scaled back climate
mitigation efforts; new deals for corporate renewable energy increased
steeply in 2018, more than doubling the newly contracted capacity in the
previous year, which also set a record.194
As of April 2019, the Fortune 500 procures about 7% of its total
electricity usage from green power sources. 195 If TVA's commercial and
190 CDP, supra note 184; Joshua Kennon, WhatAre the Sectors andIndustries ofthe S&P 500?,
THE BALANCE (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-the-sectors-and-industriesof-the-sandp-500-3957507; Volkswagen, Climate Change - What Volkswagen is Doing,
https://www.volkswagenag.com/en/news/stories/2018/12/volkswagen-accepts-climateresponsibility.htil# (last visited Apr. 8, 2020); Nissan Motor Corp., Climate Change: Strategyfor
addressing
climate
change,
https://www.nissanglobal.com/EN/SUSTAINABILITY/REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL/CLIMATE/STRATEGY/
(last visited Apr. 8, 2020); General Motors Co., Climate Change 2018 (2018),
https://www.gmsustainability.com/_pdf/cdp/ClimateChange_2018_InfonnationRequestGeneralMotors_Company.pdf.
191 GREENPEACE,

CLICKING

CLEAN

VIRGINIA

(Feb.

13,

2019),

https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Greenpeace-Click-Clean-Virginia2019.pdf.
192 REE 100 Overview, supra note 183.
193 Green
Power Partnership Fortune 500
Partners List PDFs, EPA,
(last
https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/green-power-partnership-fortune-500r-partners-list-pdfs
visited Oct. 15, 2019).
194 BRC
Deal
Tracker,
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
BUYERS
ALLIANCE,
https://businessrenewables.org/corporate-transactions/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
195 This assumes that the average Fortune 500 company uses as much electricity as the average
EPA Green Power Partner in the Fortune 500.
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industrial buyers demanded an equal portion of their energy from
renewable sources, that energy would represent just over 4% of TVA's
total energy demand and would be worth more than $440 million in
annual revenue to TVA's local distributors.196 Based on existing targets
and commitments, current renewable energy demand in the global
commercial and industrial sectors is equal to 19% of these sectors' total
electricity demand, which, under the same analysis, would represent 12%
of TVA's sales and $1.3 billion in revenue. This share is expected to
expand over the next decade.1 97 Today, only 3% of TVA's current
generation capacity is in comparable renewables (solar and wind), and
these resources are allocated to residential customers as well.1 98
New TVA CorporateCustomers. The availability of renewable or lowcarbon power plays an important role in new business recruitment, and
TVA has agreed to provide renewable power in its negotiations with
potential new businesses in the Tennessee Valley. Facebook has
committed to 100% renewable energy by the end of 2020 and enters into
contracts for large renewable energy projects for each of its new data
centers. Facebook insists on siting wind and solar projects on the same
grid as each new facility, making jobs and investment from new
Facebook facilities in the Tennessee Valley contingent upon TVA's
ability to deliver new renewable energy.199 In 2018, TVA and Facebook
announced such a partnership, bringing major solar installations to
Tennessee and Alabama to serve Facebook's $750 million data center in
Huntsville, Alabama. 200
Google, the largest corporate renewable energy buyer in the world,
also expects to provide 100% regionally-sourced renewable energy for its

196

USEIA Form 861 TVA Sales Data, supra note 182; Green Power Partnership,supra note

193.
197 USEIA Form 861 TVA Sales Data, supra note 182; IRENA, Corporate Sourcing of
Renewables: Market and Industry Trends - Remade Index 2018, 57 fig. 3.2 (2018),
https://irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/May/IRENA Corporatesourcing_2018.pdf.
198 Our Power System, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.gov/Energy/Our-Power-System
(last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
199 On Our Way to Lower Emissions and 100% Renewable Energy, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/renewable-energy/.
200 TVA Announces Largest Valley Solar Installations - Built for Facebook, TENN. VALLEY
AUTH. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/TVA-Announces-LargestValley-Solar-InstallationsBuilt-for-Facebook (statement of John Bradley, TVA's Senior Vice
President of Economic Development) ("TVA's ability to deliver large amounts of renewable,
reliable energy at competitive rates makes the Valley an attractive place to do business and recruit
quality jobs."); Jim Gaines, TVA Announces Solar Farms to Serve Google Data Centers,
KNOXVILLE
NEWS
SENTINEL
(Jan.
16,
2019),
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/money/business/2019/01/16/tva-solar-farms-google-datacenters/2595383002/.
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data centers, and it similarly requires direct renewable energy purchases
in the markets where its operations are located.20 1 In 2019, Google and
TVA announced 413 MW of new solar capacity (more than a third as
much power as provided by each of TVA's Watts Bar nuclear reactors)
to serve data centers in Tennessee and Alabama.202 In sum, these
renewable energy projects facilitated data center investments by
Facebook and Google totaling $1.95 billion. 203
Despite the significant economic opportunity available from providing
corporate buyers with affordable and reliable renewable energy, the
Tennessee Valley has a mixed record on offering attractive options for
businesses pursuing renewable energy procurement. In 2017, the trade
associations Retail Industry Leaders Association ("RILA") and
Information Technology Industry Council ("ITI") published a state
leadership index to guide member companies in their renewable energy
purchases. The report notes that "the structure of a state's electricity
market can directly influence where corporations choose to invest in
renewable projects, and in which states they decide to expand their
operational footprint." Tennessee was ranked forty-fourth out of fifty
states in the composite ranking, and tied for last (with zero points) in
"Utility Purchasing Options," which includes analysis of utility-level
structures and policies, including green tariffs, green power purchase
options, commercial and industrial retail choice, and the presence of an
independent system operator or regional transmission organization. The
report notes that Tennessee was one of only four states (along with
Georgia, Oklahoma, and Alabama) to receive a score of zero for both
interconnection and net metering policies to support distributed
generation systems.

20 4

Utilities play an important role in new corporate site selection due to
the complexity of service boundaries and diversity of utility policies.
Many electric utilities have economic development arms that offer lower
rates to attract moves or offer financial incentives to firms that adopt

201 CDP, supra note 184.
202 Gaines, supra note 200.
203 Jerry Underwood, Utility-scale solarprojects brightenAlabama's tech recruitment efforts,
NEWS
CENTER
(Mar.
8,
2019),

ALABAMA

https://www.alabamanewscenter.com/2019/03/08/utility-scale-solar-projects-brighten-alabamastech-recruitment-efforts/; Enrichingthe Montgomery County business community, GOOGLE DATA

CENTERS, https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/montgomery-county/
visited Oct. 15, 2019).

(last

204 RETAIL INDUS. LEADERS ASSOC., INFO. TECH. INDUS. COUNCIL, & CLEAN EDGE,
CORPORATE
CLEAN
ENERGY
PROCUREMENT
INDEX
(Jan.
2017),

https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/f904Obdl -7681-455a-9a64-5a518c1655 1d.pdf.
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demand management programs.20 As the Facebook and Google
examples demonstrate, renewable energy availability is often an
important factor.206
PrivateInitiatives. Although TVA has recorded high-profile successes
by making renewable energy available to Google and Facebook, the
broader policy and planning stance adopted by the region may adversely
affect the Tennessee Valley's ability to compete for existing and new
business. Edison Energy reports that 72% of large American companies
are actively pursuing additional renewable energy purchases,20 7 and a
trend toward aggregation of energy demand is expected to open the
renewable energy market to smaller companies. In 2018, first-time buyers
made up 31% of renewable energy deals. These deals were driven by
models in which firms aggregate their electricity use to sign ajoint power
purchase agreement, which allows more companies to take advantage of
economies of scale in solar and wind energy production.208 As these
trends continue, corporate demand for renewable energy may become an
increasingly powerful driver for TVA decarbonization.
The growing number of corporate customers committed to GHG
emissions or renewables goals provides an opportunity to induce TVA to
accelerate its decarbonization efforts. Firms that have made these
commitments will face challenges if TVA's carbon intensity or
renewables portfolio is inadequate. Corporate goals will be missed,
supply chain requirements will not be met, and goods and services with
a larger carbon footprint will be at a competitive disadvantage in areas
where customers value climate mitigation.
Assessing the carbon deficit that may emerge over the long term
between the decarbonization pathway of the TVA grid and the pathway
of many other utilities is difficult, and firms may be unaware of the
potential deficit. As with bondholder pressure, corporate customer
pressure for decarbonization may be induced through a mixture of dark
green and bright green initiatives that motivate and organize the interests
of the corporate sector in the TVA service area. In addition, market

205 Dan Levine, A Site Selector s Checklistfor Locating in the U.S., AREA DEV. MAG.
(2019),
https://www.areadevelopment.com/LocationUSA/2019-US-inward-investment-guide/siteselectors-checklist-for-locating-in-US. shtml.
206 For instance, Google and Facebook have insisted on renewable power for new facilities in
the TVA service area. See Underwood, supra note 203.
207 GREENTECH MEDIA INC., SHIFTING THE CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE ON ENERGY: A

SERVICE,

NOT

A

COMMODITY

(2016),

https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/01/CS-Edison-Energy-White-Paper.pdf.
208 See Green Power Providers, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., https://www.tva.gov/Energy/ValleyRenewable-Energy/Green-Power-Providers (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
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leveraging in the form of pressure on TVA's large corporate customers
by debt and equity investors may be influential.
Information disclosure that informs companies of the potential carbon
deficit and holds them to their commitments may be important.
Prescriptive requirements in the form of corporate clean energy and
renewables policies by firms ranging from Facebook to Volkswagen are
already having an effect, as are solar rooftop initiatives by Walmart and
Target, two of the largest users of solar power in the U. S. Efforts to
induce additional companies to make emissions commitments may
increase the momentum for decarbonization, as may procurement
requirements that transfer large firm emissions reduction requirements to
smaller suppliers in the TVA service area. Although TVA may be able to
resist some large corporate customer demands, demands arising from a
large number of existing businesses and from new business relocations
are difficult to dismiss, and if the costs of electricity storage decrease,
large corporate customers may be able to defect from the grid if their
needs are not met.
3. OtherLarge InstitutionalCustomers
A wide array of non-corporate and non-governmental institutions,
including colleges and universities, hospitals, museums, religious
organizations, and civic and cultural organizations, also buy large
amounts of TVA-generated power. 209 Recent announcements suggest that
many of these organizations are interested in investing in or purchasing
renewable energy. These organizations may have a range of motivations,
including cost savings, reputation, a desire to align with sustainability
norms, or religious commitments. Although these organizations'
environmental and renewable energy goals are less heavily publicized
than the goals emerging from major corporations, purchasing decisions
by these organizations could increase renewable energy demand and
place TVA's expected generation mix increasingly at odds with its
customers' expectations.
At a national level, many American nonprofit organizations are already
procuring renewable power. Of the 1,518 organizations reporting their
green power usage to the Environmental Protection Agency's voluntary
Green Power Partnership ("GPP") program, 16-20% are nonprofits,
including school districts, higher education institutions, hospitals, clinics,
religious organizations, museums, parks, zoos, and civic organizations.

These buyers typically buy their TVA-generated power through local distributors. See TENN.
AUTH., Public Power for the Valley, https://www.tva.com/energy/public-powerpartnerships (last visited May 13, 2020).
209
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These organizations are spread across 35 states, including Tennessee,
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia, and seven of the 200-plus nonprofit participants are in TVA territory.210
Among nonprofits, colleges and universities have led the move toward
renewable power. Motivated by cost savings, encouraged by student and
faculty advocacy, and facilitated by long planning and investment
horizons, more than 372 colleges and universities across the country have
committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.211 To meet these goals,
universities are making large-scale renewable energy purchases; the 166
universities represented in the GPP purchase an average of 62% of their
total electricity from green sources, with 45 already procuring 100% or
more.212 Out of this group, the 30 largest-volume university buyers alone
account for more than 3 billion kWh of green power use each year,
enough to power 290,000 typical American homes.2 13
Universities in the Tennessee Valley are underrepresented among
leaders in renewable energy procurement, but a handful of the largest
have made major strides in recent years. Several TVA-area universities
participate in the GPP (e.g., University of Tennessee, Knoxville;
Sewanee: The University of the South; and Middle Tennessee State
University).2 14 The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, which purchases
enough solar and wind power to match 67% of its electricity
consumption, is the nation's sixth largest university for green power
procurement2 15 and has committed to carbon neutrality by 2061.216
Mississippi State University has committed to carbon neutrality by 2042,
and indicates in its Climate Action Plan that "our energy generation goals
rely heavily on TVA's 2020, 2030, 2040 Climate Change Goals. A fuel
mix with an increasing portfolio of renewable energy sources is vital for
us. "17 The most ambitious goal in TVA territory belongs to Sewanee:
210 Green Power Partnership: All Partners, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/greenpower-partner-list (last updated March 18, 2020).
211 SECOND

NATURE,

2017-2018

SECOND

NATURE

IMPACT

REPORT

(2018),

https://secondnature.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-18_SecondNatureImpactReport-1.pdf.
212 Green Power Partnership 100%
Green Power Users, EPA (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/greenpower/green-power-partnership-100-green-power-users-1.
213 Frequently
Asked
Questions,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Oct. 2, 2019); Green Power
Partnership Top
30
College
and
University,
EPA
(July
20,
2019),
Green
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-10/documents/top3Ocandujuly2019.pdf;
PowerPartnership:All Partners,supra note 210.
214 Green Power Partnership:All Partners,supra note 210.
215 Green Power PartnershipTop 30 College and University, supra note 213.
216 Green
Office,
UNIVERSITY
OF
TENN.
KNOXVILLE,
https://environment.utk.edu/programs/green-office/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
217 See
MIss.
ST.
U.,
CLIMATE
ACTION
PLAN
(2012),
https://www.opdca.msstate.edu/files/capplan.pdf; ATSU Sustainable Campus Fee Program,
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The University of the South, which has committed to carbon neutrality
by 2030.218
In the last several years, the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga and
Vanderbilt University have committed to carbon neutrality by 2050, with
Vanderbilt also committing to 100% renewable energy for its campus
operations.219 In addition, in early 2020, Vanderbilt announced that it had
reached an agreement with TVA, Nashville Electric Service, and Silicon
Ranch Corporation to build a new solar facility in the TVA service area.
The facility will offset roughly 70% of Vanderbilt's annual indirect GHG
emissions from purchased electricity.220
Hospitals are large users of electric power, and some, particularly in
large healthcare conglomerates, are also signaling increasing interest in
renewable energy purchases.221 Kaiser Permanente, for example, the
largest integrated health system in the U.S., has committed to carbon
neutrality by 2020 and carbon positivity by 2025. Across its campuses
(including locations in Virginia and Georgia), Kaiser Permanente will
produce and procure enough wind and solar energy to entirely offset its
electricity demand by its 2020 target.222 It is unclear whether hospitals in
the TVA area will begin to follow the lead of these large integrated
systems.
Some religious organizations also have supported climate mitigation
and have committed to purchasing renewable energy. The Presbyterian
Church, which claims 1.4 million active members in the U.S., passed a
resolution in 2006 encouraging members and member churches to go
carbon neutral, emphasizing "the Christian mandate to care for
creation."2 2 3 The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) went a step
further, passing a declaration in 2017 targeting carbon neutrality for
MIDDLE TENN. ST. UNIV., https://www.mtsu.edu/cee/sustainable.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2019)

(showing that other campuses have made less ambitious moves, such as Middle Tennessee State,
which allows student groups to purchase renewable power credits).
218 Luke Williamson, When Will Sewanee Be Carbon Neutral?, THE SEWANEE PURPLE (Mar.
14, 2018), https://thesewaneepurple.org/2018/03/14/when-will-sewanee-be-carbon-neutral/.
219 Climate
Action
Plan,
U.
OF
TENN.
AT
CHATTANOOGA
(2011),
https://www.utc.edu/sustainability/pdfs/cap-final.pdf; FutureVU: Sustainability, VAND. UNIV.,
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/sustainability/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
220 Katherine Keith, Vanderbilt Commits to First-of-its-kindRenewable Energy Partnership
with TVA, NES, PRESS RELEASE, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY (Jan. 22, 2020, 1:00 PM),
https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2020/01/22/vanderbilt-commits-to-first-of-its-kind-renewable-energypartnership-with-tva-nes/.
221 BAY AREA COUNCIL ECON. INST., BULDING A CLIMATE-SMART HEALTHCARE SYSTEM

(Mar. 2018), http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/BuildingAClimateSmartHealthcareSystemForCalifornia-Interactive.pdf.
222 Id.

FOR CALIFORNIA

223 PAM

MCVETY,

GUIDE

TO

GOING

CARBON

NEUTRAL

https://www.presbyterianmission.org/wp-content/uploads/carbon-neutral-guide.pdf.

(2006),
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congregations and ministries by 2030 and climate positivity by 2035,
specifically indicating an expectation to substitute "clean, renewable
energy for polluting fossil fuels."224 The United Church of Christ also
encourages congregations to move towards carbon neutrality, and it
publishes a set of resources for churches to achieve this goal by sourcing
renewable energy and pursuing other strategies. 22 5 Because TVA states
are among the most religious in the country,226 demand from religious
institutions like these could play an important role in shifting TVA's
demand toward renewable sources.
These developments by nonprofit organizations have occurred without
coordination across sectors. An initiative to coordinate and harness the
interests of these organizations would likely use many of the same
information, market-leveraging, prescriptive standards, and procurement
tools as would be used in a corporate initiative. The large number of
organizations and large amount of electricity these organizations use
suggest that an initiative of this type could meaningfully increase the
demand for low-carbon or renewable energy in the TVA service area.
4. Households
Another potential source of pressure on TVA to decarbonize is
household uptake of solar systems or other household- or communitylevel renewable power, an issue that TVA noted is a material threat in its
2018 10-K.227 Household rooftop solar is more expensive than industrialscale solar, but interest around the U.S. has grown, and as of 2017 roughly
10.345 GW of household rooftop solar is now in place.228 In fact, the
demand for rooftop solar is sufficiently large to trigger a widespread
movement by utilities to push state public utilities commissions ("PUCs")

224 CHRISTIAN

CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST),

GA-1724

RESOLUTION

CONCERNING

CARBON
NEUTRALITY
(2017),
http://disciples.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/2018Yearbook2Ol7ResolutionsPP345-456.pdf.
225 Carbon Neutral Web Resources for Congregations, UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST,
https://www.ucc.org/carbon neutral web resources for congregations (last visited Oct. 14,
2019).
226 Michael Lipka & Benjamin Wormald, How religious is your state?, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/how-religious-is-yourstate/?state-alabama.
227 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83.
228 T. Wang, U.S. residential sector annual solar PV capacity installations 2018, STATISTA
(July 31, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/185694/us-residential-annual-pv-installedcapacity-since-2005/.
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to adopt line charges and other financial disincentives for household
adoption of solar photovoltaic ("PV") systems. 229
Uptake of rooftop solar systems in the TVA service area has lagged
behind many other regions, however, and TVA and its local distributors
have only made limited solar PV options available to households.230 For
instance, one of the most popular programs that TVA and the Nashville
Electric Service offered to subsidize household installation of solar PV
systems was cancelled at the end of 2019.231 If storage technologies
improve and decline in cost, however, TVA and its local distributors face
a risk that households will defect from the grid. Private initiatives along
the lines of those discussed above may induce more rapid household grid
defection in the absence of more rapid TVA grid decarbonization.
C.

Demand

Private initiatives need not simply rely on applying pressure on TVA
to increase the supply of low-carbon or renewable power. Instead, a mix
of negative and positive inducements is available. TVA and other utilities
have expressed concerns about reduced demand for their product arising
from efficiency and conservation by households and large customers.
Private initiatives could include "carrots" in the form of initiatives that
increase electricity demand along with the "sticks" of demands for lowcarbon or renewable power.
1. Efficiency and Conservation
For the first time since the end of World War II, U.S. per capita
household electricity demand leveled off in 2010 and has declined over
the last several years.232 To the extent this decline in demand is occurring
in the TVA service area as well, it is easy to understand why TVA
identified household efficiency and conservation as a material threat in
its 2018 10-K. Households represent a large share of TVA's demand, so
they account for a large share of TVA's GHG emissions as well.

229 See Jacques Leslie, Utilities Grapple with Rooftop Solar and the New Energy
Landscape,
YALE ENV'T 360 (Aug. 31, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/utilities-grapple-with-rooftopsolar-and-the-new-energy-landscape; Ptacek & Carter, supra note 52.
230 Sophie Quinton, Why There Aren't Many Rooftop Solar Panels in the South, THE PEW
CHARITABLE
TRUSTS
(Feb.
10,
2016),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/02/1 0/why-there-arent-many-rooftop-solar-panels-in-the-south.
231 Green Power Providers, supra note 208.
232 Davis, supra note 23.
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The TVA service area is among the worst in the U.S. in terms of
household electric efficiency.2 33 This creates an opportunity for a private
initiative to target household electricity use. TVA and its local
distributors have incentives to shift demand to times when electricity can
be produced at low cost, but they cannot be expected to exacerbate a
material threat to their finances, so it is unlikely that they will engage in
a large, effective household efficiency effort.2 34 A large-scale,
sophisticated private initiative that targets the most promising
opportunities could accelerate TVA's decarbonization by reducing
electricity demand.2 35
Even without a reduction in electricity demand, the TVA area's carbon
footprint could substantially decline if TVA combines decarbonizing
electricity generation with electrifying appliances, heating and cooling
systems, and other household uses of energy. Although electric heating
is not as efficient as gas, if the electricity is generated from renewable
sources, it has a smaller carbon footprint. 236 Other building electrification
could occur via water heaters, stoves, and other appliances, along with
lawn mowers, leaf blowers, and other yard equipment.2 37 Electrification
of water heaters alone could substantially increase electricity demand
while reducing carbon emissions, so the advantages to TVA are
considerable.2 38
2. Electrificationof the Motor Vehicle Fleet
Electrification of the motor vehicle fleet is another potential carrot for
TVA, and it could reduce the carbon footprint of the TVA service area
substantially if it is combined with decarbonization of the electric grid.
Electric vehicles currently make up 2% of the global market, but their

233 See S. ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE SOUTHEAST: 2018
ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://cleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018-Energy-Efficiency-in-

the-Southeast-SACE-2.pdf.
234 Michael P. Vandenbergh& Jim Rossi, Goodfor You, Badfor Us: The FinancialDisincentive
for Net DemandReduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527 (2012).
235 For a discussion of household carbon emissions opportunities, see Dietz, et al., supra note
24.
236 Learn
about
Energy
and
its
Impact
on
the
Environment,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/energy/learn-about-energy-and-its-impact-environmient#impact (last updated
Aug. 12, 2019).
237 Trieu Mai, et al., ElectrificationFutures Study: Scenarios ofElectric Technology Adoption
and Power Consumption for the United States, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (2018),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl8osti/71500.pdf.
238 Cf Asa Hopkins, et al., Decarbonizationof Heating Energy Use in California Buildings,
8SYNAPSE
ENERGY
ECON.,
INC.,
6
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.synapseenergy.com/sites/default/files/Decarbonization-Heating-CA-Buildings-17-092-1.pdf
(describing
replacement effect of water heater electrification based on California energy grid).
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price is anticipated to drop below the cost of petroleum-fueled vehicles
by the mid-2020s, and momentum is growing for electrification of the
motor vehicle fleet in the U.S. and around the world.239 As Table 3
indicates, many countries plan to have electric vehicles make up 50% or
more of all vehicles sold by 2030 to 2040, and others have adopted a
target of 30% by 2030.
Table 3 Electric Vehicle Targets240
Countries with EV Sales Targets or ICE
Bans of 5000 or More
Country

Target
100%

Canada

China

40-50

Target Date
2040

2040

Costa Rica

1000

2050

Denmark
France
leeland
Ireland

100040
10000
10000
10000

2030

I r el

1000

2030

Netherlands

10000

2030

Notlay

Potgal

100

1 t4

040
J030

2030
0 3202

1000

Slovenia

1000 0

030

Spain
United Kingdom

1000,
10000

040
040

Note: Countries committed to EY30 &30 (30% EV
sales by 2~030 are Canada. china Fiand, Fne,
India, Japan, MexicoNetherlands Norway. Sweden,
and United Kingdom.

239 Emily Lindsay Brown, Cars of the future that will help fight climate change - Imagine
newsletter #3, THE CONVERSATION (June 13, 2019, 11:11 AM), https://theconversation.com/carsof-the-future-that-will-help-fight-climate-change-imagine-newsletter-3 -118289.
240 Global EV Outlook 2019: Scaling up the transition to electric mobility, INT'L ENERGY
AGENCY (May 2019), www.iea.org/publications/reports/globalevoutlook2019/; E-Mobility Trends
and Targets: as of July 1, 2019 (constantly updated), PARTNERSHIP ON SUSTAINABLE Low
CARBON TRANSPORT (2019), https://slocat.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SLOCAT_2020_emobility-overview.pdf.
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In addition, many local governments in the U.S. and around the world
have adopted targets for electrification of municipal government fleets.241
This movement has begun to make headway in the TVA service area as
well. For instance, the Nashville city council adopted a bill that will
require the municipal government to fully electrify its fleet, with
exceptions for some emergency vehicles, in increments over the next
decade.242
The growth of the electric vehicle market also has accelerated the
development of battery technologies that might alleviate range anxiety
and the intermittent supply issues linked to various renewable generation
options.24 3 Implementation of battery technologies with two-way
communication also could enable more efficient use of other distributed
electricity resources on the grid.244 This can create a system that benefits
consumers by reducing consumption, providing detailed energy use data,

and increasing comfort.2 4 5
TVA has noted in its 10-K that it and its local distributors will likely
be affected by the changes in energy use patterns resulting from this
integration,246 and TVA is working on a vehicle electrification
program.247 Not surprisingly, TVA's initiative on this topic includes a
roadmap aimed at "identifying the path forward for electric vehicles in
Tennessee." 248 TVA is evaluating electric vehicle adoption strategies
related to compatibility of charging stations for different vehicles, the
impact on the grid, processes to maximize efficiency, and development
of smart charging stations.249
3. A New PrivateBargain
Given the environmental and economic benefits to the TVA service
area of decarbonization and the benefits to TVA of increased demand,
this may be a propitious time for public or private policymakers to
facilitate a new understanding between TVA on the one hand and the
cities, local distributors, and electricity customers in the TVA service area
on the other hand. The original bargain Congress approved in creating
241 An example in the Southeast is Savannah, Georgia. See Savannah to replace 300 cars in
municipal
fleet
with
EVs,
GREENWIRE
(June
25,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060654569/search?keyword-savannah.
242 ORD. No. BL2019-1598, supra note 145.
243 TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 15.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 20.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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TVA was focused on facilitating electrification of the largely rural
Southeast, with the primary goals of facilitating economic development
while also committing to conservation of the region's resources. In return
for electrification, the governments and citizens in the Tennessee Valley
gave up the standard mechanisms of private financing (through investorowned utilities) and political control over their electric utilities, in favor
of a more harmonized regional approach inspired by the New Deal's
ideals for public power. Later developments shifted the bargain to focus
on goals such as the development of coal and nuclear power, while
retaining the emphasis on economic development, but TVA's recent
resource planning has given short shrift to goals related to conservation
of the region's resources, and especially to long-term carbon reduction
goals.
A new bargain for TVA could recommit TVA to its dual primary goals
of economic development and resource conservation. TVA would
commit to accelerating its power generation transition to bring it in line
with the deep decarbonization pathway, and in return the cities, local
distribution utilities, and major electric customers in the TVA service
area would commit to accelerating electrification of the building and
transportation sectors. This could spur new forms of private investment
while addressing the mismatch between TVA's carbon pathway and the
goals of many of its customers. For instance, an accelerated uptake of
electric vehicles could take place through purchases of fleet vehicles and
adoption of policies and programs (including storage and incentives for
vehicle-to-grid connection) that make it easier for the owners of personal
motor vehicles to switch to electric vehicles. With increased reliance on
vehicle electrification, TVA may be well positioned to collaborate with
local governments in building vehicle charging infrastructure while
spreading the costs across the region in its rates. 250 Such a bargain would
provide TVA an opportunity to maintain or increase total electricity
demand-helping to stabilize its revenues (and reduce risk for its
investors)-in exchange for TVA's commitment to reduce long-term
carbon emissions. It would also provide citizens in the region with an
electric grid, buildings and transport system that, at best, will be an engine
for new forms of economic growth, and, at the very least, will not leave
the area at a competitive disadvantage. The deep polarization regarding
climate change may make it difficult for federal or state government
policymakers to achieve this type of bargain, particularly given the
political and demographic characteristics of TVA's service area, but a
250

For discussion of some of the challenges and opportunities with electrification presented by

traditional utility regulation, see Alexandra B. Klass, Public Utilities and Transportation
Electrification, 104 IOWA L. REv. 545 (2019).
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focus on economic competitiveness by local government and private
sector leaders may bypass polarization and provide more viable pathways
for reform.
CONCLUSION

A shortcoming of private environmental governance is that no one
individual or organization is responsible for allocating resources toward
the areas of greatest opportunity and lowest risk of negative spillover
effects. No private governance equivalent exists to the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, Chair of the White House Council
on Environmental Quality, or chair of the relevant committees in the
House and Senate. In the absence of strategic management, it is up to
philanthropists, think tanks, NGOs, investment groups, business
managers, and scholars to identify opportunities and allocate resources.
This Article takes a step in this direction by exploring the role of
private environmental governance in addressing GHG emissions sources
that are largely beyond the scope of government regulation. TVA serves
as a valuable case study of gap-filling by private initiatives that are
directed toward difficult-to-regulate entities. Even if the federal
government and state governments in the Southeast do not take a
leadership role on climate mitigation a remarkable number of private
environmental governance actors and instruments are available. What is
lacking is the conceptual framework that will enable public and private
policymakers to move from asking "What can government do?" to asking
"What can any organization do?" As this Article demonstrates, once that
hurdle has been crossed, many instruments are available for private
initiatives to increase the motivation for deep decarbonization. Private
environmental governance can play a gap-filling role regarding TVA, and
the risk of displacing better public options is trivial.
TVA is a good example of a hard-to-regulate organization regarding
climate change, but many other organizations in the Southeast, elsewhere
in the U.S., and around the world are similarly hard to regulate. Whether
because they are quasi-public organizations or organizations located in
national or subnational jurisdictions that are resisting climate mitigation,
these actors often require new thinking to achieve prompt, major GHG
emissions reductions. The TVA case study explored in this Article is just
one example of the important role private initiatives can play in the global
response to climate change.
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1

Investor Pressure-Bondholders
TVA Debt

Long term net:
Short Term:
Total:
Future debt: (2019-2023 and
"thereafter")

$21.307 billion
$2.332 billion
$23.639 billion
$22.696 billion

2019:

$1 216 billion

2019
2020
2021
2022
2023

$1.116 billionl
$1.092 billion
$1.901 billion
$1.072 billion
$69 million
$17.474 billion

Thereafter:

TVA Bondholders as of June, 2019

Aberdeen Asset
Management

Eumedion

1,200,000

Aegon NV
Allianz SE

Climate Action 100
Climate Action 100

199,720,000
22,000,000

251
252
253

TVA 2018 10-K, supra note 83, at 46.
Id.
Id. at 109.
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BlackRock

Ceres, ESG Research
Australia, Eumedion,
Green Bond Principles,
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105,705,330

IIGCC, SASB
California Public

Ceres, Climate Action

Employees
Retirement System

100, Eumedion, IIGCC,
SASB

300,500,000

(CalPERS
Capital Group Cos
Inc.
Charles Schwab
Investment
Management
Citigroup
Credit Suisse AG

Eumedion, SASB

65,785,000

SASB

5,614,000

Green Bond Principles

70,990,000

GIIN, Green Bond

3,160,000

Principles

Deutsche Bank AG

GllN, Green Bond

2,'185,'000

Principles
Fidelity International

Goldman Sachs
Grouip ic
Investec Asset
Management
J.P. Morgan

SASB
Greeni Bonid PinMciples

319,000
13,800,000

IIGCC

20,631,000

GllN, Green Bond

47,785,000

Principles
Legal & General

SASB

3,455,790

GIIN
GIIN
G11N, Greeni Bonid
Pin1ciplIes, Ceres,

25,000
623,3 82,000
15,020,000

Group PLC
Mercer

Metlife
Morgan Stanley

SASB
Natixis SA

Ceres, Green Bond
Principles

47,986,000

Neuberger Berman

GllN, Climate Action
100, Ceres, SASB
GUN, SASB

785,000

GllN, SASB

595,000

Group LLC
Northern Trust
Corporation
Nuveen Investments

1,650,000
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TIAA
Prudential Financial
Inc.
Sarasin Partners
LLP
SSGA
State Street Corp
Swiss Life Asset
Management
UBS AG

Ceres, Green Bond
Principles
GllN

12,525,000

IIGCC

3,348,635

Ceres, SASB
SASB
IIGCC

15,720,000
21,328,975
500,000

Green Bond Principles,

26,600,000

184,923,827

SASB
UBS Asset
Management
Vanguard

Climate Action 100,

120,000

IIGCC
ESG Research

617,681,325

Australia, GIIN, SASB
Wells Fargo & Co

Ceres, Green Bond

52,820,933

Principles, SASB
Total Amount Held

2,490,089,040
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